Abstract
It is a commonly shared opinion among phenomenologists that temporality is a constitutive part of subjectivity. As living subjects, we are bound to time, but we are able, as Refslecting subjects, to alter or to change this external, objective time into an immanent, lived one.
“Nee tarnen invenitur, nee est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius ; quia sit esset prius se ipso”1—Thoughout my paper I am going to be addressing this: “being prior to oneself.”
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Notes
“The second way is from the nature of efficient causes: In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither it is, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself ; for it would be prior to itself, which is impossible” Thomas, Summa Theologica, I. q. 2, a. 3, The Summa Theologica, Edited with an Introduction by Anton C. Pegis (New York: Modern Library College Edition, The Modern Library, 1948).
Let me mention here the article where I give evidence for this interpretation of Husserl’s late analysis of time ; “Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs sur la temporalité (1929–1935) de Husserl,” , Alter 2 (1994), 63–86.
One idea that might well be able to capture this kind of affection is perhaps Eckhart’s and his concept of Abgeschiedenheit. A renewed (because embodied) version of Husserl’s unbeteiligten Zuschauers could also be fitted in.
G. Brand, Welt, Ich und Zeit, (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1955), § 13–14 (die Refslexion im Ansatz)
K. Held, Lebendige Gegenwart (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1966), 94–126 (Selbstvergemeinschaftung). See also K Held, “Phänomenologie der Zeit nach Husserl,” Perspektiven der Phänomenologie, Bd. 7 (1981), 199 ff
J.-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943)
Sokolowski, The Formation of Husser Vs Concept of Constitution (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970).
Let me Refser here to the concept of “self-alterity” (altérité à soi) I used in a previous work about intersubjectivity in Husserl (Transcendance et incarnation, le statut de l’intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez Edmund Husserl, Paris, Vrin, 1995) in order to account for the genetic process of intersubjectivation.
H. Dreyfus (cf. Being in the World, MIT Press, 1991, Introd., x) suggested translating Befindlichkeit with “affectedness”. See also the most recent translation of Sein und Zeit by Joan Stambaugh (State University of New York Press, 1995). (Th. Kiesel’s choice, “disposedness” or Marcarrie’s, “disposition” seem either awkward or a bit too plain.) I thank F. Varela for giving me access to these different choices of translation.
R. Barbaras, “Le sens de l’auto-affection chez M. Henry et Merleau-Ponty”, Epokhè 2, (1991), 91–113, especially 98.
E. Levinas, “Intentionalité et sensation,” in En découvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 155–156.
E. Levinas, Le temps et Vautre (1946–47) (Paris: P.U.F., 1985), Préface (1979), 9–11.
U.E. Levinas, Autrement qu ‘être ou au delà de V essence’ (den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1978), 36–39.
Op. cit., 41.*U.E. Levinas, Autrement qu ‘être ou au delà de V essence’ (den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1978)
M. Henry, L’essence de la manifestation (1963), (Paris: P.U.F., 1990), 582–583.
M. Henry, Phénoménologie matérielle (Paris: P.U.F. 1990), first Part.
The ambivalence inherent in the concept of retention has been quite precisely shown by R. Bernet in his articles “La présence du passé (Husserl)” and “La voix de son maître (Husserl et Derrida),” both recently published in La vie du sujet, Recherches sur l’interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie (Paris: P.U.F., 1994).
This has been very well shown by Y. Yamagata in his article “Une autre lecture de L’essence de la manifestation: immanence, présent vivant, altérité,” Etudes philosophiques 2(1991).
M. Henry, C’est moi, la vérité, pour une philosophie du christianisme (Paris: Seuil, 1996).
For all this, let me Refser to the second Part (“Temporalité de l’auto-antécédance”) of a forthcoming book called Lucidité du corps. La chair transcendantale comme possibilité de la phénoménologie. With regard to this point about time I am primarily endebted to F. Varela and P. Vermersch. See N. Depraz, F. J. Varela, P. Vermersch, On becoming aware, steps towards a phenomenological pragmatics (MIT Press, forthcoming).
As far as such a conception of reduction as a praxis is concerned let me Refser to 1) “Das Ethos der Reduktion als leibliche Einstellung,” in Phänomenologische Ethik, ed. B. Waldenfels (München: Fink Verlag, 1997); 2) “The phenomenological reduction as a praxis,” Journal of Consciousness Studies (1998).
J.-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 538–612: “Liberté et facticité: La Situation.”
Heidegger spoke of the being of being as a wonder; just before dying, Husserl told his wife that he had just seen something wonderful.
Fink mentions the reduction as a katastrophè; Levinas links the face-to-face relationship with a timeless trauma.
H. Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (Berlin: Springer, 1929).
As for such a description ofthat full mobility as a constitutive aspect of emotion in its unceasing fluctuation, see my “Délimitation de l’émotion. Approche d’une phénoménologie du cœur,” in Alter 7 (forthcoming).
Hua XI, especially the chapter about Erfüllung. In The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1989), F. Varela (and al.) uses a very well chosen word to account for this attentively passive receptivity: he calls it “mindfulness.” It was translated into French by “présence attentive.”
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Depraz, N. (1998). Can I Anticipate Myself? Self-Affection and Temporality. In: Zahavi, D. (eds) Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9078-5_5
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