Abstract
In the fall of 1688 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz embarked on a trip through Germany to collect material for the history of the House of Braunschweig, a work he never completed, much to the dismay of his patrons, the Electors of Hanover. On December 31 he arrived in Sulzbach, a small town in the upper Palatinate some fifty kilometers east of Nuremberg, where he remained for an entire month. What attracted Leibniz to this small and politically insignificant place, and why did he remain there for so long on a trip where he stayed hardly anywhere else for more than two nights?1 The answer lies in the little known figure of Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636–1689) and his reputation as the greatest living Christian Kabbalist.
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References
A = Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Darmstadt und Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1923—.
G = Gerhardt, C. I., ed., Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. 7 vols (Berlin, 1875–90), repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962.
L = L. Loemker, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2 vols (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956).
A. Foucher de Careil, ed., Leibniz: La Philosophie Juive et la Cabale (Paris: August Durand, 1861), p. 56.
J. Baruzi, Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre (Paris: Alcan, 1907).
The major recent exceptions are Carolyn Merchant, “The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz’s Concept of the Monad,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979): 255–69; eadem, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper Row, 1980); Anne Becco, “Aux sources de la monade: paléographie et lexicographie leibniziennes,” Etudes Philosophiques 3 (1975): 279–94; eadem, “Leibniz et François Mercure van Helmont: bagatelle pour des monades,” Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft 7 (1978): 119–42; and Bernardino Orio de Miguel, “Leibniz und ‘die physischen Monaden’ von Fr. M. van Helmont,” in I. Marchlewitz and A. Heinekamp, eds., Leibniz’ Auseinandersetzung mit Vorgängern und Zeitgenossen (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), pp. 147–156; idem, Leibniz y La Tradicion Teosofico-Kabbalistica: Francisco Mercurio van Helmont, 2 vols (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1993).
B. Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (2nd ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), preface.
Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, d’après des documents inédits (Paris: Alcan, 1901), p. x. For a similar view see J. M. Child, The Early Mathematical Manuscripts of Leibniz (Chicago: Open Court, 1920), p. 11. This is essentially Cassirer’s view in Leibniz’ System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (2nd ed., Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 1962). For modern subscribers to this view see P. Schrecker, “The Unity of Leibniz’ Philosophical Thought,” Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, tr. Paul and Anne Schrecker (Indianapolis & New York, 1965) and J.W. Nason, “Leibniz and the Logical Argument for Individual Substances,” in R.S. Woolhouse, ed., Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 11–29.
Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, p. 14.
Quoted in Ross, Leibniz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 9.
Ibid, pp. 1–2.
See my book Leibniz and the Kabbalah (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
Leibniz mentions Pisani’s translation in Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae, 1667 (A VI, 1:300) and Alphabeti vere Hebraici in the same year (A VI, 1 : 283).
Leibniz described this meeting in a letter to Christian Philipp (A I, 3:442).
Becco, “Leibniz et François-Mercure van Helmont: Bagatelle pour des Monades,” p. 120.
15/25 February. A I,1:235.
L. Loemker, “Leibniz and Boyle,” The Journal of the History of Ideas 16 (1955): 22–43.
Aiton, Leibniz: A Biography (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1985), p. 100.
G. Grua, ed., G. W. Leibniz: Textes inédits, 2 vols (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1948), I:91. This passage appears in a review Leibniz wrote in 1695 of An account of W. Penns travails in Holland and Germany, anno MDCLXXVII for the service of the Gospel of Christ... (London, 1695): “Car rien ne nous sçauroit mieux marquer les perfections divines que les beautés admirables qui se trouvent dans ses ouvrages. Je vois que la pluspart de ceux qui pretendent à une plus grande spiritualité, et particulierement les trembleurs, tachent de donner du degout pour les contemplations des verités naturelles. Mais à mon avis ils doivent faire tout le contraire s’il ne veulent entretenir nostre propre paresse ou ignorance <c’est en quoy je trouve Messieurs Helmont, Knorr, Morus et Poiret plus raisonnables que la pluspart des autres, quoyque je ne veuille point autoriser plusiers de leurs sentiment ou ils s’eloignent de L’Eglise> L’amour <veritable> est fondé sur la connoissance de la beauté de l’object aimé. Or la beauté de Dieu paroist dans les merveilles des effects de cette cause souveraine. Ainsi plus on connoist la nature et les verités solides des sciences reelles, qui sont autant de rayons de la perfection divine, plus on est capable d’aimer Dieu veritablement.... “ The brackets [< >] signify insertions made by Leibniz.
For Leibniz’s interest in alchemy, see Baruzi, Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre, pp. 209–13; G. Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 135ff. For the letters between Leibniz and Schuller, see L. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza (Berlin: Reimer, 1890), pp. 284–96.
Ross denies that this was a Rosicrucian society (Leibniz, p. 5) as Couturat suggested in La Logique de Leibniz, p. 131, note 3.
Ross, Leibniz, p. 5.
Journal de Trévoux (January, 1737), p. 6ff; Ross, Leibniz, p. 5.
For example, Leibniz distinguishes between a “Cabbala quaedam vulgaris” (G VII: 184) and a “cabala sapientium,” which would be useful for his “calculus generalus” or “característica” (G VII:49). Such a Kabbalah would be a “cabale non chimérique” (A I, 2: 168; G VII: 199). See H.H. Knecht, La logique chez Leibniz (Lausanne: Editions L’Age d’Homme, 1981), pp. 31, 73, 157, 354ff.
The literature on this subject is enormous as a look through Studia Leibnitiana and collections of essays on Leibniz readily reveals.
R. W. Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, tr. J. P. Stern (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952; first published in German in 1948), p. 118ff; G. MacDonald Ross, Leibniz p. 5ff.
G. H. Pertz, ed. Tagebuch in Geschichtliche Aufsätze und Gedichte Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Gesammeltewerk (Hannover, 1847; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966): “7. August. Habe diesen Abend mit Herrn von Helmont viel geredet, wegen Erd ausbringen: ob Schiebekarrn guth. Durch motum hominis mit den Karrn viel tempus und vergebene Mühe. Praestat, hominem movere sine motu tanto sui. Von Gold schlagen. Von Braten und Kochen mit eisern Kasten. Zu redressiren, so krumb gewachsen, darinn er in Tractatu de Microcosmo et Macrocosmo, so teutsch nicht völlig sub tit. Paradoxa übersetzt. Von Drucken mit dem Fuss: mit beiden Händen spinnen. Hechel (p. 189).... 8. August ... Den Hern. Helmont meine Gedancken gesagt vom geschwinden fortkommen auff Schuhfedern. Von Voiture auf allezeit glatten Boden. Er meinet ... [symbol for mercury and for copper] sey gemacht” (p. 190)....
J. Baruzi, Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre; L. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz.
As Anne Becco has shown in “Leibniz et François-Mercure van Helmont: bagatelle pour des monades.”
Foucher de Careil, Leibniz, p. 56.
For example, B. Russell: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz; E. J., Aiton: Leibniz: A Biography; S. Brown: Leibniz (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1984).
D. Garber, “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,” in K. Okruhlik and J. R. Brown, eds., The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 27–130; Catherine Wilson: Leibniz’s Metaphysics: a historical and comparative study (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 2 and passim.
L I:90.
“Ad Fundamenta Cabbalae Aëto-Paedo-Melissaeae Dialogus,” Kabbala denudata, 2 vols (Sulzbach, 1677, 1684; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1974), I, pt. 2, pp. 310–11: “Materia, quâ talis non est spiritus; sed illa ipsa tantum substantia, quae sub formâ materiae apparet, in caecitate nimirum & quiete illa, atq; privatione prioris felicitatis, aliquando spiritus fuisse, & adhuc fundamental iter & radicaliter talis esse, & talis aliquando iterum fore formaliter, diceretur ... materiam factam statuerem è coalitione monadum spiritualium torpentium ... [p. 311] quippe cjus definitionem ne unicus quidem terminus positivus jure meritò ingredi debet....”
ibid., p. 312: “Essentiam autem diviam essentiam ... dividi posse, non admittimus, sed unitatem in eâ quam maxime veneramur. Sicut ex. gr. cum in fonte quodam limpidissimo occultae latent particulae aliquae terrestres & petrosae, & illae deinceps separantur & concrescunt, nemo dicit fontem dividi in lapillos, sed lapillos separari: ita Creator primò quidem produxit infinitas spirituum myriades, cum ipso in summo felicissimae perfectionis gradu unitas ... ita ut Deus esset omnia in omnibus: deinde autem ob varios adhibiti arbitrii proprii gradus, horum facta est secretio, tot graduum, quot sunt cognitionis; ad extremem usque, qui est istius privatio; adeoque mors illa, aliquando iterum absorbenda ... hae particulae è quibus mundus materialis constat, non possunt dici, esse Divina Essentiae, sed illius naturae, quae à divinâ Essentiâ effecta, constituta, producta, facta, creata, extra posita fuit. Potestque constrictio haec vocari somnus ... vel mors, &. Et evigilatio ... quae à nobis vocatur Secretio scintillarum, tot habet gradum ascensûs, quot statui possunt descensûs; quorum extrema tarnen non sunt alia, quam ultima Deo contrapositio in statu mortis, & summa cum Deo unio, (licet non unitas)... .”
In his article in this volume (pp. 13–14) Stuart Brown argues that van Helmont’s kabbalistic idea that matter originated from the clinging together of increasingly imperfect monads does not accord with Leibniz’s notion of bodies as aggregates since Leibniz’s material aggregates are formed from a collection of “real beings.” I would argue, however, that there is indeed a similarity between van Helmont’s kabbalistic concept of matter and Leibniz’s. In both cases immaterial, soul-like substances have produced, and always exist together with, what appears to be matter, but this matter remains essentially soul-like or monadic.
For example, Garber, “Leibniz and the Foundation of Physics: The Middle Years.”
Joseph Dan argues against the use of the terms “Gnosticism” and “gnostic” on the grounds that they are too imprecisely used to be meaningful (“Jewish Gnosticism?” Jewish Studies Quarterly 2 (1995): 309–28. Michael Allen Williams makes the same point at greater length in Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). It is therefore with some trepidation that I use the term in this article. I do so simply because many early Christians used the term, much scholarship has been directed at its elucidation, and because I can think of no better way to describe the radical (and, from what became a main-stream Christian perspective, heretical) idea that individuals can gain the necessary knowledge for salvation through their own efforts, without the intervention of Jesus and the Church. I agree with Elaine Pagels that this idea, characteristic of gnostic Christians, survived as a suppressed current, reemerging periodically, especially among radical sectarians in the seventeenth century. See Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 150.
J. Hein,“The Endurance of the Mechanism-Vitalism Controversy,” The Journal of the History of Biology 5 (1972): 170.
Walter Pagel, Joan Baptista van Helmont: Reformer of Science and Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
L.J. Russell, “The Correspondence between Leibniz and de Voider,” Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, ed. R. S. Woolhouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 104–118.
Letter to de Voider: “Ego vero non tollo compus, sed ad id quod est revoco, massam enim corpoream quae aliquid praeter substantias simplices habere creditur, non substantiam esse ostendo, sed phaenomenon resultans ex substantiis simplicibus quae solae unitatem et absolutam realitatem habent” (G 11:275).
D. Garber and R. Ariew, trs. and eds., G. W. Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991), p. 48.
In his article “Leibniz und der Pietismus,” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 48 (1966): 364–86, Peter Baumgart argues that Leibniz believed in the perfectibility of man and draws a parallel between this aspect of Leibniz’s philosophy and the pietism of August Hermann Francke. The missing link in this accurate picture is the Kabbalah.
Leibniz uses the word “cultus.” Loemker translates this as “cultivation;” Garber and Ariew as “development.”
L II:797–8. Leibniz anticipated some of these ideas in virtually the same words in a letter to Sophie dated 4 November 1696 (Hanover, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, LBr 389, f. 66). This provides additional evidence that these speculations were occasioned by van Helmont’s theories.
Walker, D. P., The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
M. Fichant, ed. & trans., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: De L’Horizon de la Doctrine Humaine, 1693; Аπокαтαστασις παναν (La Restitution universelle, 1715 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), p. 108, note 24. This, of course, is also the sentiment expressed in Ecclesiastes: “What has happened will happen again, and what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun” (1:9).
The great Platonic year was the name name given to the period it took for the seven planets known to Plato together with the fixed stars to return to the same position relative to the earth and to themselves. This is described in the Timaeus, 39 c-d.
Fichant, pp. 56ff: “Posito satis durare humanum genus, tempus venire necesse est ubi nihil dicatur, quod non dictum sit prius. Etsi certum non sit, tempus affuturum quo nihil dici possit, quod non dictum sit prius. Fieri enim potest ut quaedam etsi tota impenderetur aeternitas, nunqum dicantur, ea ergo semper supererunt dicibilia et nondum dicta. Nunquam dantur regressus perfecti, ut circulorum et ellipsium, nec fieri potest, ut unus locus aut unum tempus universi alteri perfecte sit simile sed tantum ad sensum. Posito autem aliquando nihil dici quod non dictum sit prius, oportet esse tempus quoque, quo redeant etiam eadem gesta, nihilque fiat quod non factum sit prius, nam quae geruntur materiam praebent sermonibus. Imo necesse est esse periodos quasdam anno platonico similes, ita ut toto aliquo seculo exacte ad sensum eadem fiant quae aliquo alio seculo jam sunt facta; nam totius seculi res pro magno aliquo facto, et totius seculi Historia pro magno aliquo dicto haberi potest, quaelia et ipsa necesse est vel repeti vel exhauriri, id est post exhaustionem etiam repeti. Quae de diversis temporibus eorundem locorum seu earundem rerum, extendi etiam possunt ad diversa loca ejusdem temporis, ut eadem recurrant; imo in unaquaque mente tales intelligi possunt periodi, cum cogitet semper, etiam cum confuse et sine animae attentione. Et licet ponamus venire tempus, quo non supersit humanum genus; si tarnen supersint intelligentes substantiae, quae non aliis quam nos cogitandi materiis, sive notionibus, utantur, idem de illis contingere oportet. Hinc porro, quia dignitati naturae consentaneum non est, ut priora tantum repetantur, consequens est, ut eatur ad intelligentias factas perfectiores, quae alias habeant notiones profundiores, et quae capaces sint majorum et magis compositarum veritatum; ita sciendo profici poterit infinitum. Itaque conveniens foret, si durarent humanae mentes, et platonicos quosdam annos haberent, eundem hominem reverti, non ut simpliciter in orbem redeat, sed ut velut spiraliter aut tortuose, inde progrediatur in aliquod majus. Est regredi ad prosiliendum magis, ut ad fossam. Fieri tarnen etiam potest, ut progressus sit non spiralis aut aliter regressivus; qualis cycloidum secundararium; sed directus, qualis in cycloide primaria. Et fortasse quaedam creaturae platonicas habent periodos, aliae secus. In periodicis foret non tantum animae immortalitas, sed et aliquid corporis resurrectioni aequipollens, si non ipsa sit. Imo illud video periodos platonicas evitare non posse, saltem in notionibus quae manere debent seu quae sunt distinctae, ubi non detur materiae novitas, sed formae seu combinationis quae terminatur. Et revera confusae notiones si quis intelligeret resolvuntur in distinctas; cum ergo etiam mentes quae eunt ad majorem perfectionem tantum majores faciunt propositiones, quae ex minoribus componuntur, erunt acta earum composita ex majore tantum combinatione anteriorum actarum, atque ado progressione spirali seu anno platonic cum augmento, ita ut credi possit redire saepe eosdem ad telam persequendam....”
ibid., p. 74ff: “... Caeterum vel ex his judicari potest genus humanum semper in hoc statu non esse mansurum; quia divinae Harmoniae consentaneum non est eadem semper chorda oberrare. Credendumque est vel ex naturalibus congruentiae rationibus res vel paulatim, vel etiam aliquando per saltus in melius proficere debere. Quanquam enim subinde in pejus ire videantur; hoc ad eum modum fieri putandum est, quo interdum recedimus ut majore impetu prosiliamus. Denique etiamsi non semper duraturum sit quale nunc est genus humanum; modo tarnen semper ponamus existere mentes veritatem cognoscentes et indagantes; sequitur aliquando mentes eo perventuras, ut veritates a sensuum testimonio independentes seu Theoremata purae scientiae, quae scilicet exacte per rationes demonstrari possunt, quae jam inventa sunt, magnitudinem (verbi gratia paginae si scribantur) non excedentia; et multo magis breves sententias quae verbis scribi possunt; redire necesse sit. Itaque nova theoremata invenienda oporteret crescere magnitudine in infinitum, quemadmodum videmus quasdam esse propositiones Geometricas satis longas, et tarnen pulchras. Hoc si fieret, necesse foret mentes etiam quae nondum satis capaces essent, fieri capaciores, ut tarn magna theoremata capere et excogitare possent, qualibus etiam opus foret ad cognoscendam penitus naturam, veritates physicas revocando ad Mathematicas, v.g. ad cognoscendam machinam animalis, ad praevidendum quaedam futura contingentia certo verisimilitudinis gradu, atque adeo etiam ad mira quaedam in natura praestandum, quae nuc suprant humanuni captum... . Et quaevis mens horizontem praesentis suae circa scientias capacitatis habet, nullam futurae.”
ibid., p. 173.
Petersen was born in Lübeck. He studied in Giessen, Rostock, Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Jena. He met Philipp Jacob Spener, one of the founders of the Pietist movement, in 1675. In 1680 he married Johanna Eleonore von und zu Merlau. With her he embraced millenarianism, which led Lutheran officials in Celle to remove him from his position in Lüneburg as superintendent of Churches. After reading the work of the English mystic and follower of Boehme, Jane Leade (1623–1704), Petersen and his wife accepted the doctrine of apocatastasis, or universal salvation, both publishing books in support of it.
Fichant is the first to have published this manuscript (LBr 720, f. 2v): “Ego qui saepe cogitare soleo, quomodo fieri queat ut dotes magnorum hominum maxime in communia commoda proficiant,vidi a Te posse profiscisci, quod saepe optavi, justum opus rerum coelestium heroico carmine comprehensum. Theologia enim sublimior etiam in prosa splendet, qui si induat virgilianam majestatem, quam tu unus et omnium optime circumdare posses. Materia tanti operis: primum Deus in abdito aeternitatis sibi perpetuo sufficiens, turn Cosmogonia, mox Oeconomia providentiae in gubernatione rerum; sed altera pars operis de futuris, sive ad corpora sive ad animas pertineant et ad hunc vel alium, ubi de purification animarum et restitutione rerum, vel potius amplification et exaltatione per gradus. Novissimam nec infimam partem dari optem magnitudini coelestis regni et ut sic dicam Aulae divina, ibi admiranda Angelicarum virtutum pingenda essent vivis coloribus et beatarum animarum celebranda felicitas, quibus non noster tantum sub pedibus orbis sed innumerabiles mundi paterent, et varus in omne aevum spectaculis divinae sapientiae et bonitatis, incederent magis magisque amorem et venerationem supremae Mentis. Hie castus elegantissimarum fictionum locus esset; etsi nihil a nobis tarn pulchrum fingi possit, quod non veritate superetur. Praeter Te autem, a quo tale quid sperari posset, neminem novi, cui et divinarum rerum recessus interiores patent, et vim eloquendi entheam” (Fichant, pp. 25ff).
ibid., pp. 95, 97: “... L’auteur ajoute que quelques-uns ont encore soutenu cette doctrine, surtout au temps de la Réforme. La Comtesse anglaise, dans les Opuscula philos, quibus continentur principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae, 1690 (Opuscules philosophiques, où sont compris les principes de la philosophie la plus ancienne comme de la plus récente), ecrit: “Le Christ a sanctifié dans la nature de l’homme la nature de toutes les créatures ... afin de restaurer les créatures de la corruption.” (Cette Dame était une Comtesse de Connaway, et soeur du Chancelier Henneage Finch, comme on se souvient l’avoir entendu du sieur Helmont.. .. M. François Mercure van Helmont a voulu soutenir de diverses façons dans ses Cogitata in Genesim (Pensées sur la Genèse), et ailleurs aussi, la Restitution et le progès vers le mieux; mais il considère que l’état ordinaire des âmes est une métempsycose; il demeure toujours un nombre déterminé d’âmes humaines (et de chaque espèce); elles seraient amenées par les révolutions des corps à des corps toujours supérieurs et toutes ensemble glorifiées en mêmes temps dans leur chef, le Christ; il soutient bien plus que le Christ est lui-même une métempsycose d’Adam, en qui toutes les autre âmes humaines ont préexisté et doivent de nouveaux parvenir à la perfection avec lui et en lui. Suivent d’autres idées aussi extraordinarires qui lui sont venues sa vie durant.”
See for example: Johann Wilhelm Petersen, Das Geheimniss der Erst-Gebohren aller Creaturen von Christo Jesu dem Gott-Menschen (Frankfurt, 1711), pp. 23–29, 41–44, 187, 190–195; idem, Мυστηριoν απoкαταστασεως; παντων, das ist, Das Geheimnis der Widerbringung aller Dinge. .. Pamphilia (Offenbach), 1700–1, I:85–86, where he quotes pages of Conway’s book.
G. Grua, ed., G. W. Leibniz: Textes inédits. 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), I:94, note 47.
ibid. p. 94: “De Progressu infinitum [Grua thinks this was written sometime between 1694–1696]: Si omnia inter ascendendum descendant rursus, nec recta progrediantur, quaeritur qua ratione in infinito progressus definiatur, sitne ascensus an descensus an neutrum. Si ascendere rem dicamus, dicet alius rursus descendere post longas períodos, etsi aliquando iterum ascendat. Dico igitur verum esse ascensum, si assumi nunc possit puctum infra quod non amplius descenderetur, et post aliquod tempus utcunque longum rursus perveniretur ad punctum altius infra quod non amplius descenderetur. Atque ita in infinitum. Idemque contra est de descensu. Quod si nullum sit punctum, de quo dici possit nunc vel aliquando: huc non redibitur. revolutio erit in qua nec ascensus nec descensus.”
ibid., I:95: “An Mundus Perfectione Crescat [1694–1696] Quaeritur an totus mundus perfectione crescat aut descrecat. An vero eandem semper perfectionem servet, quod potius puto, tametsi diversae partes perfectionem inter se varie permutent, ut invicem transferatur. Si eadem manet mundi perfectio, non possunt quaedam substantiae perfectione perpetuo crescere, quin alia perfectione perpetuo descrescant. Substantia perfectione crescens aut continue crescit, aut crescit rursusque decrescit, sed ita ut tarnen plus crevisse quam decrevisse deprehendatur. Si qua substantia sive directe sive interpositis regressibus progreditur perfectione in finitum, necesse est ut nunc assignari possit gradus perfectione maximus infra quem in posterum nunquam sit descensura, et aliquo tempore elapso rursus alius major priore. nec tarnen ideo necesse est, ut promoveatur semper summus gradus ascensionis. Quo casu necesse est infimum gradum ascensionis intra datum tempus, etsi semper promoveatur, tarnen certum limitem attingere, vel tandem incidere in summum ascensionis, quo casu tunc substantia in aeternum eundem perfectionis gradum servaret. Si infimus gradus aliquando cesset promoveri, vel saltem limitem habeat, ultra quem non ascendat, at summus gradus ascensus promoveatur semper, progressus est in infinitum perfectionis, sed is tum perfectus est cum infimus descensus itidem nullum limitem habeat, supraque non sit ascensum. Sed si substantia in infinitum descendat infra gradum quemvis, et ascendat etiam infra gradum quemvis, videbitur tarnen ascendere si magis ascendat quam descendit. An dicemus mundum necessario crescere virtute, quia animae omnibus praeteritis afficuntur, neque enim, ut alibi demonstravimus, ulla datur apud animas perfectat oblivio, etsi distinctum non recordemus, totum tarnen quod nunc percipimus ex partibus consistit, in quas ingrediuntur omnes actiones praecendentes. An igitur animae semper debent evehi per periodos ad expressiores cogitationes. Si fieri non potest ut detur perfectio quae non augeri queat, sequitur perfectionem universi semper augeri; ita enim perfectius est quam si non augeatur. [Voluptas] beatitudo non consistit in summo quodam gradu, sed in perpetuo gaudiorum incremento. Summum illud Ens perfectione non augetur, quia est extra tempora et mutationes, et praesentia futuraque eaque complectitur.” Grua places brackets around words or phrases deleted by Leibniz.
As Grua points out these refer to neshamah, ruah, nefesh, which are described in Seder Olam — or the order of the ages. Wherein the doctrine is historically handled, translated out of Latin, by J. Clark, M. D., upon the leave and recommendation of F. M. Baron van Helmont (London, 1694), para. 41, which Leibniz had read.
insertion.
The worlds of creationis, formationis, factionis, are described in both the Zohar and the Seder Olam.
Grua indicates deletions with square brackets.
Grua’s transcription is only a resume of the full text (Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, MS LBr 67, ff. 52–3: De Homine. Beatitudine. Deo. Christo [1694–1696]). 1) In Homine est spiritus, anima et corpus: seu Mens, Ratio, caro vel sensus. Mens superiora considerat, Ratio aequalia, sensus interiora. Mundi tres, divinus, Angelicus <spiritualis>, sensibilis. Mundus superior eminenter continet inferiora. Inferior est umbra superioris [Angelos omnem mundum inferiorem in sese habet spiritualiter, ut exhibere etiam possit si velit.] Deus continet omnia in uno, et ad hoc unum omnia tendunt, hoc est summum omnium bonun. Bonum est internam et externum, illud est verum, hoc est falsi nominis bonum. Internum profluit ex nobis, externum <generali acceptione> fortuna dici potest, nec in potestate est. 2) Bona particularia externa sunt fortunae (corporis, ingenii), aeque vel a natura, vel studio, vel casu acquiruntur; possunt tarnen omnia certo sensu fortuita dici, et veniunt a caelo (id est universali corporum cursu) et ut dantur a casu, sic ab eo auferuntur. 3) Homo terrenus est ex hoc mundo seu limo; unde pendet a caelo seu fortuna; homines dum student fortunae bonis, servos se faciunt astrorum <ut bruta>. Fortuna servos <motu suo> exercet, ut manipuli triturando torquentur. Sed pars hominis immortalis debet fato astrali seu corporis impressionibus dominari. Fato sapientia major (qui parten immortalem sui cogitant, et angelos agnoscunt fratres, et Deum patrem et corpus servum). Nam parts nostri melior ut angelica ad imaginem Dei creata est. Qui his contemplandis sese exercent, et aeterna versant, animo a sensibus abducto, illi corporeo contagio eximuntur, et astris dominantur. sub pedibusque vident nubes et sidera coeli. 4) Tristesse et joie indument liées à la fortune. 5) Elle prête seulement ses dons; tort d’y tenir. 6) Tous cherchent le bien supême, diversement. 7) Richesses, bien trompeur ou passager, et non honorable. 8) Honneur fortuit et leurre. 9) Gloire posthume limitée. 10) Plaisirs, beauté, passagers. Pas de bonheur sur terre. 11) Les biens terrestres se concurrencent. Seul Dieu réunit tous les biens. 12) Même réunis, ils ne seraient que l’ombre des vrais biens. 13) Vrai bonheur en Dieu, sagesse, justice, félicité essentiellement. 14) Dieu unité. Adhérant à Dieu, nous devenons un “teste primogenito” (Jo. 17). 15) Les hommes deviennent heureux “adeptione divinitatis”, fils de Dieu par le Christ. 16) La fin des choses, c’est le bien. Nous en écartant, nous renions notre être. 17) Tout obêit à Dieu. Le mal n’est rien, vient de la privation dans les créatures. 18) “Mala sunt quatenus non omnia attingunt summum bonum.” Cependant le mal même sert aux bons. 19) Mal faire est impuissance. “Mali serviunt bonis, ut bestiae hominibus”. 20) Anmélioration par le châtiment. 21) Impunité n’est pas chance mais maladie. Pitié pour les méchants. 22) Tout événement, providentiel, est bon aux bons. 23) “Ascensus a sensibilibus ad intellectualia, a creaturis in Deum... . Deus produxit angelos dicendo fiat lux. Ex hac luce astra (vel potius formae, archaei, ideae, astrales virtutes) <(+ vel ut magis philosophice dicam, vires actrices primariae universi +)> ex his corpora. 24) “Deus maximum infinitate, indivisibilitate minimum... . Christus centrum vitae aeternae.... 25) Lucifer a cherché son bonheur en soi. C’est une loi de la nature qui condamne cette “philautia” comme idolâtrie. “Ad se converti est ad nihilum tendere. De his vide Theologiam Germanicam, et Kempisium, et Taulerum. Denique Deus omnibus lucet, ut sol, sed occaecati a seipsis eum non vident”. 26) Mal possibile par aveuglement. “Sed Dei non est violare ordinem rerum supremum”. 27) “Theologia vera in cognitione Adami et Christi, nostri et Dei. D’Adam, se tourner ver soi <edere carnem et sanguinem Adae>. Du Christ, s’abandonnera à Dieu <edere carnem et sanguinem filii Dei>. “Adam externus non nocet, sed internus; nec Christus externus prodest, sed internus; ergo qui Christum fide induit, is in se habet vitam, lucem, Deum, summum bonum. (+ Omnia ad unum referre, seu ad Deum, est harmoniam rerum concipere.+). ... In tenebris creaturarum lucet divina lux.”
See, for example, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, MSS LH IV, 3, 8, 3–4, 9–10.; LH I,5,2, 15–18.
Fichant, p. 200: “Leibniz a-t-il pour autant fait sienne la doctrine de la “salvation universelle? La question déborde assurément l’interprétation de l’opuscule que nous éditions; pourtant sa teneur autant que son titre amènent à la poser, au moins aux marges de notre interprétation.”
Theodicy, par. 91, pp. 172–3.
Becco, “Leibniz et François-Mercure van Helmont,” p. 137: “C’est-ici que la plus franche cassure intervient entre van Helmont et Leibniz, qui ne peut que sourir à la doctrine de la révolution des âmes ....”
LBr 389, f. 29 (Helmstadt, 11 July 1696): “ Helmontii ingenium miratus sum. Multaque ex viro scrutatus sum quae non nisi ex viro cognosci possent. Antiquae Philosophiae Pythagorico-Platonicae, Cabbalisticaeve priscae, non vestigia, sed ideam in hoc sene perspexi. Uti ergo antiqua isthaec philosophia moralis et symbolica, ita et arguta est, nostris seculis difformis. Duo principia fundamentum aedificio suggerunt: Praexistentia animarum, ac revolutio, aut migratio earundem! Ex his cetera fluunt omnia. Non illepidus quoque, uti praesentis ubique animi est.” Von der Hart was the Duke of Brunswick’s secretary, the professor of oriental languages and librarian at Helmstedt, and a distinguished scholar, known for his Historia Consillii Constanini 1700. Von der Hardt also published a book on the practical Kabbalah (Aenigmata Judaeorum Religiosíssima. Helmstadt, 1705).
Ovid, Metamorphoses, tr. F. J. Miller. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), bk. xv, 552ff.
Michael Gottlieb Hansch, Godofredi Guilielmi Leibnitii Principia Philosophiae More Geométrico Demonstrata (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1728), p. 135.
Eléments de la philosophie de Newton, ed. Robert L. Walters & W. H. Barber, The Complete Works of Voltaire (Oxford: Alden Press, 1992), 15:242, 244.
Theodicy, par. 23, p. 137.
ibid., par. 95 & 98, pp. 175, 177.
Thouverez believes Leibniz borrowed the term from Bruno (E. Thouverez., ed., Discours de Métaphysique. Paris, n. d.), as does Bréhier (M. Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie. 2 vols., Paris, 1929, II, prem. partie, p. 247). Stein disagrees (L. Stein., Leibniz und Spinoza. Berlin: Reimer, 1890. pp. 198, 201, 204, 206). Wilson suggests Leibniz took the term from Cudworth (C. Wilson, Leibniz’s metaphysics, pp. 177, 188–9.
Historire Critique de la Republique des Lettres, 1716, Article V, pp. 116–19 (the editor’s introduction to this review says it was written for the Electress Sophie Charlotte of Prussia. Hence she is the “Madame” adressed): “Les ordres de Vôtre Majesté sont toujours si raisonnables, que j’ai trouvé jusqu’ici une très-grande facilité à les executer. Mais je ne veux point dissimuler, qu’il m’est impossible à present de satisfaire sa curiosité; l’Ecrit, que vous m’avez fait la grace de me mettre entre les mains, pour en savoir mon sentiment, m’est aussi peu intelligible que le langage des Hurons. Cet aveu ne se doit nullement entendre, comme une censure de l’illustre Auteur; mais se doit uniquement rapporter à ma propre ignorance, que je suis plus prêt a avouer, que ne sont les autres à m’en faire des reproches. Il est sûr au moins, que le Systême de M. Leibnitz ne me surprend pas par sa nouveauté; puisqu’il a, en partie, un rapport visible avec la Cabale des Rabbins, comme on le peut voir dans un livre Latin, dont le titre est Cabala denudata, ou la Cabale dévoilée. Ces habiles Maîtres ne reconnoissent qu’une seule substance de toutes choses. Cette substance est l’Esprit; lequel, selon eux, est acuellement divisé en autant d’Individus, qu’il se trouve de points Mathematiques dans l’Univers. Les Accidens, dont chacun de ceux-ci est revêtu, sont ce qu’ils appellent la Matiere; laquelle n’est pas, comme vous croyez, sans doute, Madame, une Substance, mais plûtôt une Ombre, & souvent ils l’appellent un ... Rien. Tout ce qu’ils disent de la pensée de ces Esprits nombreux, de leurs diverses manieres d’union, division, assemblage, pression, ou separation, pour constituer ces quantités particulieres, que nous appelions des Corps, (mais qui ne sont, dans leur Philosophie, que des Esprits deguisés par des Ombres, ou couverts de Riens) s’accorde parfaitement bien avec les sentiments de M. Leibnitz, autant que je les entrevois. Figurez-vous donc, Madame, qu’aujourd’hui une Republique d’Esprits se fait l’honneur d’écrire à Vôtre Majesté; puisque, sans être des plus gros ou des plus gras, je renferme moi seul un assez bon nombre de Points Mathematiques, pour en former une passsable Republique. Mais je crains que quelqu’un, qui se plait aux équivoques, ne vous dise, que ce n’est que de la pure matiere qui brouille ici de papier, sans que l’esprit s’en mêle le moins du monde....”
See What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?, tr. T. Humphrey (New York: Abaris, 1983).
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Coudert, A.P. (1998). Leibniz and the Kabbalah. In: Coudert, A.P., Popkin, R.H., Weiner, G.M. (eds) Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion. Archives Internationales D’histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 158. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9052-5_3
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