Abstract
Leibniz’s scattered remarks about mysticism sound a consistent theme: there is something right in what the mystics say, but it is often badly or confusedly expressed. Never prepared to accept uncritically the claims of mystical writers, Leibniz also is unwilling to reject them entirely: “I strongly approve of applying oneself to correcting the abuses of the mystics, but as there is sometimes an excellent point mixed in with the errors... I would not want to lose the wheat with the chaff.”1 Remarks such as this go beyond a simple profession of tolerance or acceptance of the right of mystics to advance views that might be seen as heretical or inimical to the interests of established religion. In the case of at least some mystics, Leibniz voices support for the content of their teachings and suggests that despite the obscurity of their utterances, mystics are to be praised for their ability to arouse piety in their followers.
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References
Letter to Pierre Coste, 4 July 1706 (GP III:384). “I despise nothing (excepting judicial astrology and similar delusions), not even the mystics; their thoughts are most often confused, but as they ordinarily provide beautiful allegories or images that move us, this can help to render the truth more acceptable, provided that a good sense is given to these confused thoughts.” Letter to Louis Bourguet, 3 January 1714 (GP III:562). “There is something in the mystics that can be given a good sense, and I do not despise them entirely.” Letter to Thomas Burnett, 23 August 1713 (GP III:327). Leibniz’s writings are cited according to the following abbreviations: A = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Preussische (later: Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Darmstadt/Leipzig/Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923-). AG = G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, ed. and tr. R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). BC = G. W. Leibniz, Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, ed. and tr. A. Buchenau and E. Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1905; 2nd ed. 1924; 3rd ed. 1966). BH = E. Bodemann, Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen Öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover (Hannover: Hahn, 1889; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966). D = Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii Opera Omnia, ed. L. Dutens (Geneva: De Tournes, 1768; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1989). GP = Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C.I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978). Grua = G.W. Leibniz, Textes inédits d’après de la bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, ed. G. Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1948; repr. New York: Garland, 1985). Guh = Leibniz’ Deutsche Schriften, ed. G.E. Guhrauer (Berlin, 1838–40). H = G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, tr. E.M. Huggard (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985). L = G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and tr. L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 2nd ed. 1969). Mo = Mittheilungen aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, ed. G. Mollat (Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1893). P = G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, ed. and tr. G.H.R. Parkinson (London: Dent, 1973). R = G.W. Leibniz, Political Writings, ed. and tr. P. Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 1988). RB = G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, tr. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). V = G. W. Leibniz, Vorausedition zur Reihe VI — Philosophische Schriften — in der Ausgabe der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, ed. Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der Universität Münster (Münster, 1982–1991; 10 vols, with successive pagination). W = G.W. Leibniz, Selections, tr. P. Wiener (New York: Scribner’s, 1951).
For evidence of Leibniz’s knowledge of early mystical writers, see A I, 10:59; A I, 13: 397–9, 552. His familiarity with the Guida Spirituale of Miguel de Molinos and with Molinos’s subsequent trial by the Inquisition is documented in letters written between 1688 and 1691 to the Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels (A I, 5:66–8, 181–2; A I, 6:159; Grua 76–80). Leibniz actively followed the controversy concerning quietism, which culminated in the 1697 publication of Fénelon’s Explication des maximes des saints and Bossuet’s Instruction sur les estais d’oraison, où sont exposées les erreurs des faux mystiques de nos jours. See his letters to Andreas Morell (A I, 14:202–3, 548–9), Claude Nicaise (GP II:573, 579, 584, 586–7), and the Electress Sophie (A I, 14:54–5). For a brief account of the development of quietism in the seventeenth century, see J.-R. Armogathe, Le Quiétisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973). Leibniz’s knowledge of other contemporary mystics is documented below. In this paper I set aside his relationship to the Jewish mystical tradition and the writings of the Kabbalah, which he knew through his association with Knorr von Rosenroth and F.M. van Helmont. On this, see his letters to Lorenz Hertel (16/26 July 1694; A, I 10:49), the Duchess Sophie (3/13 September 1694; A I, 10:58–61), and Louis Bourguet (3 January 1714; GP III:562), as well as the notes gathered in A. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz, la philosophie juive, et cabale. Trois lectures... avec les manuscrits inédits de Leibniz (Paris: Auguste Durand, 1861).
One recent author summarizes the tradition in the following terms: “[Mysticism] can be characterized as a search for and experience of immediacy with God. The mystic is not content to know about God, he longs for union with God. ‘Union with God’ can mean different things, from literal identity, where the mystic loses all sense of himself and is absorbed into God, to the union that is experienced as the consummation of love, in which the lover and the beloved remain intensely aware both of themselves and of the other. How the mystics interpret the way and the goal of their quest depends on what they think about God, and that itself is influenced by what they experience: it is a mistake to try to make out that all mysticism is the same. Yet the search for God, or the ultimate, for His own sake, and an unwillingness to be satisfied with anything less than Him; the search for immediacy with this object of the soul’s longing: this would seem to be the heart of mysticism.” Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 1981), p. xv.
A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1900; 2nd ed. 1937).
La Logique de Leibniz, d’après des documents inédits (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1901; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1961).
Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre (Paris; Felix Alcan, 1907); Leibniz (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1909). See also Baruzi, “Trois Dialogues Mystiques Inédits de Leibniz,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (1905): 1–38.
Leibniz, p.131.
Baruzi sees this as confirmed by the readings of Russell and Couturat. Although the cornerstone of their interpretation, the “logical doctrine of a substance from which all the predicates arise analytically,” seems not at all mystical, “if we regard this doctrine from a new ‘point of view’, it reveals to us an inviolable and indestructible being, then a mind self-conscious of its independence, its reach, and its ‘silence’“ (ibid., p. 130).
Ibid.,p. 131.
Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1925), p. 116. To a greater degree than Baruzi, Mahnke acknowledges the many places at which Leibniz’s views appear to conflict with those of mystics. Consequently, he writes, “it would naturally be false if one wanted to take Leibniz to be a mystic in the ordinary sense. Although his philosophy indeed strives for a mystical deepening of rationalism, to be equally fair to both sides, it is also a rationalization of mysticism” (ibid.). See also Mahnke, “Die Rationalisierung der Mystik bei Leibniz und Kant,” Blätter der deutschen Philosophie 13 (1939): 1–73. For an earlier Statement of this reading, see Dietrich Tiedemann, Geist der Spekulativen Philosophic 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–97; repr. Brussells: Culture et Civilisation, 1969 [Aetas Kantiana 274]), 6:369ff. Tiedemann’s book was brought to my attention by Catherine Wilson’s essay “The Reception of Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century,” in N. Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 466.
Leibniz et la Querelle du Pur Amour (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), p. 226.
Heinekamp, “Leibniz und Mysticism,” in Peter Koslowski, ed., Gnosis und Mystik in der Geschichte der Philosophie (Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1988), p. 203.
The most serious defect of the interpretations of Russell and Couturat is not that they ignore important mystical elements in Leibniz’s thought, stressing instead the extent of his rationalism, but that they divorce the latter from the ethical and theological dimensions of his thought. To make the rationalist reading compelling, it must be integrated into an account of the theodicy: Leibniz’s vindication of divine justice (God’s goodness combined with his wisdom) through an explication of this as the best of all possible worlds. I attempt to do this in my book Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Cf. Heinekamp, “Leibniz und Mysticism,” pp. 191–2. In letters to Andreas Morell, Leibniz admits to a limited knowledge of Boehme’s writings, which he found obscure (Grua 116–7, 120, 126, 139). Among German mystics he seems to have given the greatest attention to the works of Valentin Weigel. In his manuscripts there are extensive notes on several of Weigel’s books (Grua 74–5/V 2074–92). Leibniz was also well acquainted with the writings of Pierre Poiret, of whose views he offers a mixed opinion (see A I, 14:557; GP III:315; GP VII: 495; Grua 84–7, 105, 120).
G. Rodier, “Sur une des Origines de la Philosophie de Leibniz,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 10 (1902):552–64; Joseph Politella, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Cabalism in the Philosophy of Leibniz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. dissertation, 1938); Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, Platon et l’Idéalisme Allemand (1770–1830) (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), pp. 57–62; George MacDonald Ross, “Leibniz and Renaissance Neoplatonism,” Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa 23 (1982): 125–34; Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
Paul Henry, “The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought,” in Plotinus, The Enneads, tr. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. xlii-lxxxiii; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. For a contrasting view, which argues for the “fundamentally biblical and Christian character of mysticism,” see Louis Bouyer, The Christian Mystery: From Pagan Myth to Christian Mysticism, tr. Illtyd Trethowan (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), p. 187.
A key document is his so-called “Letter to Hansch on the Platonic Philosophy or on Platonic Enthusiasm.” This originated as a letter to Michael Gottlieb Hansch of 25 July 1707, and was first published by Hansch as part of his 1716 Diatriba de enthusiasmo Platonico. In it Leibniz writes of Plato: “No ancient philosophy comes closer to Christianity, although we justly censure those who think that Plato is everywhere reconcilable with Christ. But the ancients must be excused for denying the beginning of things, or creation, and the resurrection of the body, for these doctrines can be known only by revelation” (D II, 1: 222/L 592). See also his letter to Nicholas Remond of 11 February 1715 (GP III:637/L 659).
Cf. GP I:380.
For an extended discussion of these topics, see Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature.
It is integral to Leibniz’s account of reason’s power that we do not possess a direct or intuitive knowledge of reality. Instead, he assumes only that human minds have access to a range of innate ideas expressing the natures of things in general, and that through these
ideas we are provided with the means to construct, at a level of abstraction, a theory of reality. An example of such a theory is his own monadology.
Cf. BH 62–3, 108–11; GP VI:75/H 98–9; GP VI:507–8/L 552–3.
For statements of this view, see Theodicy §;184 (GP VI:226/H 243); Causa Dei §;8 (GP VI:440); GP VII:305/L 488; GP VII:311/P 77; D II, 1:223/L 592.
Cf. New Essays II, iv, 17 (A VI, 6:300); IV, iv, 5 (A VI, 6:392); GP IV:571/L 585.
See Causa Dei §;§; 9, 12 (GP VI 440); and Daniel Fouke, “Emanation and the Perfections of Being: Divine Causation and the Autonomy of Nature in Leibniz,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76 (1994): 168–94.
Cf. Discourse on Metaphysics §;§;28–29.
“[God’s] goodness would not be supreme, if he did not aim at the good and at perfection so far as possible. But what will one say, if I show that this same motive has a place in truly virtuous and generous men, whose supreme function is to imitate divinity, insofar as human nature is capable of it?” (Mo 60/R 57–8).
Leibniz frequently emphasizes the significance of his definition for the debate between Bossuet and Fénelon: “And through this definition we can resolve the great question of how genuine love can be disinterested, although it is true that we do nothing that is not for our own good. The fact is that all the things we desire in themselves and without any view to their interest are of such a nature as to give us pleasure by their excellent qualities, with the result that the happiness of the beloved object enters into our own. Thus you see, Sir, that the definition ends the debate in a few words, and this is what I love” (letter to Thomas Burnett, 18/28 May 1697; A I, 14:226). Cf. A I, 14:58–9; GP III:383–4; Naert, Leibniz et la Querelle du pur Amour.
Leibniz acknowledges a long-standing debt to the German Jesuit Frederick Spee, whose Güldenes Tugend-Buch (1649) he often recommends for the prominence it gives to the virtue of divine love. See his letter to the Electress Sophie of August 1697 (A I, 14:59), with its accompanying French translation of the introduction to Spee’s book (A I, 14:891–903); his letter to Andreas Morell of 10/20 December 1696 (A I, 13:398–9); the essay attached to his letter to Claude Nicaise of 9/19 August 1697 (GP II:579); and Theodicy §;96 (GP VI: 156). On the background to the relationship between Leibniz and Spee, see Frederick W. C. Lieder, “Friedrich Spee and the Théodicée of Leibniz,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 11 (1912):147–72, 329–54. Lieder shows that the contents of the Güldenes Tugend-Buch are primarily drawn from St. Thomas. I am grateful to Ursula Goldenbaum for emphasizing Spee’s importance in this context.
To Hansch, Leibniz writes: “As opposed to mercenary love, true love is that affection of the mind by which we are brought to find pleasure in the happiness of another. For what we take pleasure in, that we desire for itself. Furthermore, since the divine happiness is the confluence of all perfection, it follows that the true happiness of a created mind is in its sense of the divine happiness. So those who seek the right, the true, the good and the just because this delights them rather than because it is profitable — although it is in truth most profitable — are best prepared for the love of God, according to the opinion of Augustine himself, who brilliantly shows that the good desire to enjoy God, the bad to use him, and who proves, as the Platonists tried to do, that the exchange of the divine love for the ephemeral is the cause of the fall of souls. Therefore, too, our happiness cannot be separated from the love of God” (D II 1.224–5/L 594). Cf. A I, 14:55–8; GP II:578; GP III:387/R 171; Mo 62–3/R 59.
See Baruzi, Leibniz, ch. 5: “Analyse d’un Exemple.” Leibniz does not explicitly mention St. Teresa in the Discourse, but the attribution is supported by a 1696 letter to Andreas Morell: “As for St. Teresa, you are right to esteem her writings, in which I once found this lovely thought, that the soul should conceive of things as if there were only God and itself in the world. This even provides a considerable object to reflect upon in philosophy, which I usefully employed in one of my hypotheses” (A I, 13:398/AG 64).
Cf. Discourse on Metaphysics §;§;14, 28.
For Plotinus, see Enneads VI.9.7: “In sum, we must withdraw from all the extern, pointed wholly inwards; no leaning to the outer; the total of things ignored, first in their relation to us and later in the very idea; the self put out of mind in the contemplation of the Supreme; all the commerce so closely There that, if report were possible, one might become to others reporter of that communion.... God ... is outside of none, present unperceived to all; we break away from Him, or rather from ourselves; what we turn from we cannot reach; astray ourselves, we cannot go in search of another; a child distraught will not recognize its father; to find ourselves is to know our source” (tr. MacKenna). Cf. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. X; and Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, chs. 4 and 7.
Enneads VI.9.9 (tr. MacKenna).
Theodicy, Preface (GP VI: 27–8). In the same passage Leibniz affirms that our ideas provide an adequate basis for knowledge of the divine: “In order to love God, it suffices to consider his perfections, which is easy, for we find ideas of them in ourselves. The perfections of God are like those of our souls, but he possesses them without limits; he is an ocean of which we have received only drops; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness — but they are all present in their entirety in God” (GP VI:27). Cf. Monadology §;30 (GP VI:612/AG 217).
This is the “apophatic” or negative way in mystical theology, which finds its most influential exposition in the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius: “This then be my prayer. .. by thy persistent commerce with the mystical visions, leave behind both sensible perceptions and intellectual efforts, and all objects of sense and intelligence, and all things not being and being, and be raised aloft unknowingly to the union, as far as attainable, with Him Who is above every essence and knowledge. For by the resistless and absolute ecstasy in all purity, from thyself and all, thou wilt be carried on high, to the superessential ray of the Divine darkness, when thou hast cast away all, and become free from all” (Mystical Theology, I.1). The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, tr. John Parker (Merrick, NY: Richmond Publishing Company, 1976; originally published 1897), p. 130. On the unknow-ability of God, see also Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, VII. 3; Epistles 1, 5; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, ch. 8; Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1992), ch. 1.
For the Platonic roots of this distinction, see A.-J. Festugière, Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon (Paris, 1936); Bouyer, The Christian Mystery, ch. 15; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, passim. Fénelon draws explicitly on the contrast between “méditation” and “contemplation” in his version of quietism. See Armogathe, Le Quiétisme, pp. 84–7. In his letter to Hesse-Rheinfels of 15/25 March 1688, Leibniz makes a gesture toward preserving this distinction (A I, 5:67); however, it plays no systematic role in his philosophy.
Leibniz repeats this point on many occasions. See Meditations on the Common Concept of Justice: God makes “himself known to the human race... through the eternal light of reason which he has given us, and through the wonderful effects of his power, of his wisdom and his infinite goodness, which he has placed before our eyes” (Mo 61/R 58); and his notes on the published account of William Penn’s 1677 travels through Germany and Holland: “The light [which illuminates our understanding] is nothing other than the knowledge of great truths ... without which I do not believe one could have a true love of God, since one cannot love without knowing and without recognizing the beauty of what one loves. Thus, in order to love God, it is necessary to know his perfections, which the eternal truths represent to us when, on penetrating into the foundation of things, we see there the great order and wholly marvelous universal harmony, which is to the divinity what a ray is to the sun” (Grua 89; cf. 91).
Later in the same passage he writes: “I wish that Valentin Weigel, who in an extraordinary book not only explains the blessed life through deification but frequently recommends a death and quiet of this sort, had not given us grounds to suspect a similar opinion [namely, that the soul returns to God in death], along with other quietists. The chief to affirm this position is the man who calls himself Angelus Silesius, the author of some beautiful sacred poems entitled Der cherubinische Wandersmann. In another way Spinoza tends toward the same view” (D II, 1:225/L 594). See also the essay attached to his 9/19 August 1697 letter to Claude Nicaise: “To wish to sever one’s self from one’s self and from its good is to play with words; or if one wishes to go into the effects, it is to fall into an extravagant quietism, it is to desire a stupid, or rather affected and simulated inaction in which under the pretext of resignation and the annihilation of the soul swallowed up in God, one may go to libertinism in practice, or at least to a hidden speculative atheism, such as that of Averroes and of others more ancient, who held that our soul finally lost itself in the universal spirit, and that this is perfect union with God” (GP II:578/W 566).
See his 1697 letters to Andreas Morell (A I, 14:548–9) and the Electress Sophie (A I, 14:57); and the preface to the Theodicy (GP VI:27–8).
Memoir for Enlightened Persons of Good Intention §;11 (K X 10–11/R 105). See also the final paragraph of his review of the book Pansophia by W.H. von Luettichau, published in the Nouveau Journal des Sçavans, September-October 1696 (A I, 13: 232); and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, ch. 3.
Cf. the preface to the New Essays (A VI, 6:71/RB 71).
See, in particular, his letters to Nicholas Remond of 10 January and 26 August 1714 (GP III:605/L 654–5; GP III:624–5). For a discussion of this aspect of Leibniz’s method, see Albert Heinekamp, “Die Rolle der Philosophiegeschichte in Leibniz’ Denken,” Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 10, 135–9.
Letter to Andreas Morell, 1/11 October 1697 (A I, 14:548). For other occurrences of the phrase, see GP II:539; GP III 327, 384, 562. In an earlier letter to Morell, Leibniz writes: “I am naturally led to attach myself in things to what must be praised in them, without worrying very much about what can be criticized in them. ... I read books not in order to censure them but in order to profit from them, with the result that I find some good everywhere, though not equally” (A I, 13:398).
Cf. Grua 79: “If quietude only goes as far as contemplation of the eternal truths contained in the divine perfections and a constant apprehension of the infinite being insofar as it is such, without regard to our particular interest and earthly things, there is nothing to find fault with. For, indeed, the mental vision which accompanies an act of love for God above all things is only that. Thus, the method of quietude taken in this sense would be nothing but a spiritual device for making last longer than usual the act of divine love recommended to us by Jesus Christ and by theologians, both mystical and nonmystical, which is the most essential point of our religion.”
This is especially so in the case of Fénelon: “I believe that the intention of the Archbishop of Cambrai has been to elevate souls to a true love of God, and to that tranquility which accompanies the enjoyment of it, while at the same time avoiding the illusions of a false quietude. Whether he has successfully carried out his plan, I cannot yet say. However, I trust that he will not be misunderstood, and the description of the book that I have seen in the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants confirms me in this opinion, for it seems to me that everything I have read could be given a favorable interpretation. However, as I see some judicious people find fault with the work, or demand further explanation, I suspend my judgment concerning it; while waiting for further clarification, I would always be inclined to have a favorable opinion of an author, especially when one also has evidence of his merit, and I believe that there is no matter that deserves being pressed more than the true love of God” (GP II:579). Cf. his accompanying letter to Nicaise of 9/19 August 1697 (GP II:573). Leibniz expresses a similar attitude toward Pierre Poiret’s L’Oeconomie divine, ou Système universel et demontré des oeuvres et des desseins de Dieu envers les hommes (1687) in his letter to Morell of 1/11 October 1697 (A I, 14:549). In his letter to Hesse-Rheinfels of 15/25 March 1688, he extends the same charity to “Tauler, Ruysbroek, Valentin Weigel, and other mystics, both Catholic and Protestant” (A I, 5:66).
Leibniz makes this criticism on a number of occasions in his correspondence with Morell. See Grua 120, 139.
“The world is addicted to trifling things. One does not think of what makes for genuine happiness. Reasons alone are not enough to ensure their own entry. Something is needed which incites the passions and enchants the soul, in the way that music and poetry do” (Grua 88–9). Cf. Theodicy, “Preliminary Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason,” §;9 (GP VI:55); GP III:562 (quoted in n. 1).
On the True Theologica Mystica (Guh. I:410–13/L 367–9). For a convincing demonstration that the contents of this essay are consistent with the rest of Leibniz’s philosophy, see Heinekamp, “Leibniz und Mysticism,” pp. 201–3. The date of the work is uncertain but it likely stems from the same period (1688–90) as his notes on Valentin Weigel (see n. 14). Like them, the essay is written in German and there is some similarity of language. Leibniz’s assertion “Gott ist mir näher angehörig als der Leib” (Guh I:412) is a clear echo of a phrase he quotes from Weigel’s Vom orth der Welt: “Die seele ist näher als der leib, aber gott ist mir noch näher als die seele” (V:2088). The idea of the essay is defended in a letter to Friedrich Bierling of 7 July 1711: “Even Mystical Philosophy, such as that of Plato and Pythagoras, has its uses, as does Mystical Theology among us, and it serves to move people’s minds more forcefully” (GP VII:497; cf. 487). The contrast between a “true” and “false” (or “good” and “bad”) mysticism is invoked on many occasions; see A I, 5:66; A I, 5:600; A I, 14:202; GP II:573, 576.
Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, I.1.
To Marie de Brinon, he writes: “It is not enough, Madame, to recognize the attributes of God in a theoretical and general manner, when one has practical opinions that reverse them. For in that case one risks recognizing them only in name, without penetrating to their true sense. ... I pray to God that he gives us and conserves in us true charity, by making us place our happiness in the practical knowledge of his perfections, which leads us to imitate them by seeking to bring about the good so far as is possible” (letter of 19/29 November 1697; A I, 14:745).
“I admit that I have never been able to appreciate that quietude or inaction, or that purely passive state that some mystics introduced long before Molinos. These are the fantasies of people who do not consider sufficiently the nature of the human mind. The bad thing is that while the ancient mystics remained in theory, Molinos (if one believes the excerpts from his trial) has drawn from it the consequences of a very false and extremely dangerous practice; but as Cardinal Petrucci has disavowed these consequences and other serious authors have defended his propositions despite their falsity, I do not see why the Pope must demand a retraction from him...” (A I, 5:181–2). Leibniz expresses a similar view of millenarianism: “[0]ne should not persecute those who are called Chiliasts or Millenarians for an interpretation of the Apocalypse which appears auspicious [to their beliefs]. The Augsburg Confession opposes only those Millenarians destructive of the public order. But the mistake of those who wait patiently for the Kingdom of Jesus is quite harmless” (A I, 7:36–7). See Daniel J. Cook, “Leibniz and Millenarianism,” presented at the VI. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover, July 1994. In his letter to Nicaise of 9/19 August 1697, Leibniz suggests that nothing has done more to promote the spread of quietism and other mystical movements than the force exerted to suppress them (GP II:573–4).
Letter to the Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 29 June/9 July 1688. Cf. A I, 14:548.
The passage continues: “Among people who have extraordinary views, I have found almost only M. van Helmont who agrees with me on the great principle of charity, and in whom I have noticed a genuine ardor for the good, although in other respects we often have very different opinions on particular matters” (ibid.). See also Leibniz’s letter to Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf of 2/12 October 1697: “One finds in the world many well-intentioned people; the problem is that they do not agree and do not work in concert. If there were a way of finding some sort of glue to unite them, it would be a great thing. Unfortunately, people of good will often have certain quirks or particular opinions which cause them to be contrary to one another. We see this, for example, in Mlle. Antoinette de Bourignon, who scorned everyone else. ... If only we could banish the sectarian spirit, which consists at bottom in the ambition that everyone else should be ruled by our maxims, whereas we should be satisfied to see that they work for the principal end” (A I, 14:557). The same idea of toleration is stressed in his reaction to Marie de Brinon’s assertion that the only way to heaven is by the path of Rome: “I would praise even your charity, Madame, provided that you did not say that one must send to the devil whoever is not of Rome” (draft letter to Marie de Brinon, 19/29 November 1697; A I, 14:741). In another version of the letter, he writes: “Keep, if you wish, purgatory, transubstantiation and all your seven sacraments; keep also the pope with all his clergy, we do not oppose ourselves to these... . Save yourself only from two things, namely, affecting the honor of God through a cult of creatures who give bad impressions of the good in people, and injuring the charity one owes to human beings through a sectarian and condemnatory spirit, the consequences of which again reflect on the honor of God, whose idea is destroyed by condemnatory sectarians who make him appear unjust and tyrannical, and in a word, give him qualities that are those of his enemy” (A I, 14:743; cf. 745). For the background to this correspondence, see Eric Aiton, Leibniz: À Biography (Bristol: Adam Hilgar, 1985), pp. 180–5.
“Today’s ‘enthusiasts’ believe that they also receive doctrinal instruction from God. The Quakers are convinced of this, and their first systematic writer, Barclay, claims that they find within themselves a certain light which itself announces what it is... . Some half-wits, when their imaginations become worked up, form conceptions which they did not previously have; they become capable of saying things which strike them as very fine, or at least very lively; they astonish themselves and others with this fecundity which is taken to be inspired. They possess this ability mainly in virtue of a powerful imagination aroused by passion, and a fortunate memory which has copiously stored the turns of phrase of prophetic books which they are familiar with through reading or through hearing them talked about. Antoinette de Bourignon adduced her gift for speaking and writing as proof of her divine mission... . There are people who, after practising austerities or after a period of sorrow, experience a peace and consolation in the soul; this delights them, and they find such sweetness in it that they believe it to be the work of the Holy Spirit.... [Yet] the way these people clash with one another should further convince them that their alleged ‘inner witness’ is not divine, and that other signs are required to confirm it. The Labadists, for instance, disagree with Mile Antoinette; and although William Penn travelled to Germany for the purpose, apparently, of bringing about some kind of mutual understanding among those who rely on this ‘witness’, he does not appear to have succeeded. ... It is indeed desirable that good people should agree with one another and should work in unison; nothing could contribute more to making the human race better and happier. But they must themselves be truly numbered among the people of good will, that is, people who do good and are reasonable and ready to learn.” New Essays IV, XIX (A VI, 6:505–7/RB 505–7).
In the draft of his letter to Gilles Des Billettes of 11/21 October 1697, Leibniz speaks of his “zeal for advancing the public good in general without regard for differences of religion or nationality and without dwelling on matters of self-interest. I am not a phil-Hellene or a philo-Roman but a phil-anthropos. My great interest is to be able to contribute to the search for truth and the advancement of the arts and sciences” (A I, 14:622–3; cf. A I, 14:625/L 475).
I would like to thank Daniel Cook and Steven Strange for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Rutherford, D. (1998). Leibniz and Mysticism. In: Coudert, A.P., Popkin, R.H., Weiner, G.M. (eds) Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion. Archives Internationales D’histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 158. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9052-5_2
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