Abstract
To proceed along this path, first of all we have to identify the way in which we should set about the task of thinking; then we shall have to focus our gaze on the play of darkness and light in which the principle can show itself in its authentic essence. The way to understand the principle consists in abandoning the logical and grammatical operativity of the principle itself. According to Leibniz, a proposition is true if the predicate belongs to the subject. Praedicatum inest subjecto: i.e., nihil est sine ratione. This twofold theorem of Leibniz’s has determined the forms and developments of all modern scientific thought; but in Heidegger’s opinion, this influence is nothing but proof of the greatness and functional power of the principle, which still remains unexplored in its ontological content.
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Reference
H. G. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, Mohr, Tübingen 1983, p. 55.
Cf. H. Jonas, The Nobility of Sight, in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,” 1954, pp. 507–519.
SG, P. 118.
GPh VII, p. 289.
SG, p. 205.
Ibid., p. 185. On Being as foundation and abyss, see also HGA 51, pp. 62ff.
Ibid., p. 93.
HGA 48, p. 328.
SG, p. 28.
Ibid., p. 93.
1bid., p. 94.
HGA 12, p. 11.
E. Fink, G. Baumann, Seminar. Zu Hölderlins Hymne “Patmos” (1967), unpublished. I thank Susanne Fink for kindly having allowed me to use and quote from th i s unpublished manuscript, preserved in the Fink Archives of Freiburg.
HGA 12. p. 11.
J. Wahl, Sur des écrites récents de Heidegger et de Fink, “Revue de métaphysique et de morale,” 63, 1958, p. 480.
Ibid., p. 482. Cf. the essay by F.W. von Herrmann, Bewufßtsein, Zeit, und Weltverständnis, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1971, which presents the problem of the world in a composite perspective composed of reflections by Heidegger, Husserl, and Fink. Heidegger’s 1929–30 course (now in HGA 29–30) is fundamental.
F. Hölderlin, Mnemosyne, Il Fassung, Stuttgarter Ausgabe, 2, I, p. 195. The image of the Geviert, of the Fourfold, is not intended to refer to a traditional horizon such as the one Heidegger calls onto-theo-logical; as regards this matter, see ID, second part (“Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik”), pp. 37–73. Cf. also R. Boehm, Was heifßt theologisch denken? Zur Onto-Theo-Logik, in Sein und Geschichtlichkeit (edited by I. Schüßler and W. Janke), Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1974, pp. 257–273.
On the question of the other beginning of thought, see the reflections in the Beiträge zur Philosophie, HGA 65, pp. 171ff. There it is specified that the other beginning is “the return to the first and viceversa,” or the passage that follows the “return to the ground of metaphysics” of which Heidegger spoke as early as the 1920s. “The other beginning, from a new originality, helps the first beginning to obtain the truth of its history and thus its inalienable and absolutely peculiar diversity, which becomes fruitful only in the historical dialogue among thinkers” (HGA 65, p. 187).
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Cristin, R. (1998). The Path: From the Foundation to the Abyss. In: Heidegger and Leibniz. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9032-7_4
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