Abstract
The concept of “autonomy as self-rule” that I argued for in the preceding chapter is a concept of autonomy grounded in an understanding of the determination of action along the lines of the “helmsman” metaphor. In making the shift from formal concerns to substantive, the view of autonomy under the metaphor of the helmsman shifts the focus of the concept from “independence” or “self-sufficiency” to that of active evaluative assessment. Autonomy does not require detachment from external influences. Rather, it requires that the agent actively assess these influences rather than simply react to them. External influences do not cause action, but rather provide information (facts) which the agent, as “helmsman”, then steers according to. This understanding of autonomy in terms of acting as helmsman of one’s own behavior requires more specific development. How can we distinguish when a person does and does not act as “helmsman”?
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References
Gibbard, Alan Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990 ), p. 18.
Gibbard, Wise Choices. Apt Feelings p.18.
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings p.19.
For example, see E.J. Bond’s distinction between “Motivating Reasons” and “Grounding Reasons” in Reason and Value (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982 ); and Joseph Raz’s distinction between “Explanatory Reasons” and “Guiding Reasons” in Practical Reason and Norms ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990 ).
See discussion of Dworkin in chapter one.
WWolf, Susan “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” in Schoeman, Ferdinand (ed.), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ), pp. 46–62.
Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, p.56.
Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, p.55.
Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, p.55.
This idea developed from a seminar on “value” offered by R.G. Frey. I would like to thank Professor Frey and the members of that seminar for stimulating these ideas.
We may, however, find the agent responsible for autonomously placing themselves in this condition. For example, the captain of the Exxon Valdez is held responsible for being in a drunken condition. But this is different than finding the actual behavior under this condition to be autonomous.
See Raz, Joseph The Morality of Freedom.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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May, T. (1998). Developing the Helmsman Metaphor. In: Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9030-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9030-3_4
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