Abstract
Despite the rise in prominence of the concept of autonomy, the concept remains vague at best. Joel Feinberg attributes this vagueness to the fact that autonomy is used in different contexts,1 although he admits the uses are closely related. Gerald Dworkin attributes the vagueness of the concept to the fact that ‘autonomy’ is a “term of art”,2 which will not repay an Austinian investigation into its uses. But the concept of autonomy is used in very concrete roles, and is a key issue in many practical debates. If the concept is to serve in this role, we must have an idea of just what the concept is about, if only in the abstract.
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References
See Feinberg, Joel Harm to Self ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 ).
Dworkin, Gerald The Theory and Practice of Autonomy ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988 ), p. 6.
See Dorsey, Gray Lankford “The Necessity of Authority to Freedom”; Hendel, Charles W. “Freedom and Authority as Functions of Civilization”; and Bokser, Ben Zion “Freedom and Authority”; all in Freedom and Authority in Our Time: Twelfth Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion ( New York, Harper and Brothers, 1953 ).
Dorsey, Gray Lankford “The Necessity of Authority to Freedom”.
Hyek, F.A. The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp.156–157.
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty p.122.
Raz, Joseph The Morality of Freedom ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 ), p. 372.
Raz, The Morality of Freedom pp.373–374.
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty p.131.
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty p.131.
For References to the EE, I use The Complete Works of Aristotle ed. by Jonathan Barnes, ( Princeton: Bollingen, 1984 ).
For References to the EN and Pol., I use The Basic Works of Aristotle ed. by Richard McKeon (NY: Random House, 1941 ).
Cole, E.B., “’Autarkeia’ in Aristotle”, University of Dayton Review Vol.19, No.3 (Winter 1988–89 ), pp. 35–42.
Cole, “’Autarkeia’ in Aristotle”, p.36.
Cole, “’Autarkeia’ in Aristotle”, p.38.
Kant, Immanuel Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals trans. by James W. Ellington, Hackett Publishing Co., 1981 ).
Feinberg, Joel, Harm to Self ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 ).
Rawls, John A Theory of Justice ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 ).
Wolff, Robert Paul, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals p.7.
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals p.44.
I shall use “principle of action” in a way which for our purposes is identical to Kant’s “maxim of choice”.
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals pp.22–23.
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals p.44.
Beck, Lewis White, “Apodictic Imperatives” in Wolff, Robert Paul (ed.), Kant: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Text and Critical Essays) ( Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969 ), p. 147.
Feinberg, Joel Harm to Self ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 ), p. 28.
See Christman, John The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.5–6. Although I differ with Christman concerning what this core concept is, I owe to him the recognition that a core concept is a possibility in Feinberg’s account.
Rawls, John A Theory of Justice ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 ).
Rawls, A Theory of Justice p.514.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice p.515.
While Rawls has, since writing A Theory of Justice retreated from metaphysical conclusions (see, for example, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs vol.14 (1985), pp.223–251), there remains a question concerning whether such a retreat is possible given his desert-based argument that the natural lottery undermines a view that justice can be based upon those characteristics which are acquired by “luck”. Regardless of whether or not Rawls’ retreat is valid, the discussion of autonomy (pp.510–515) seems incontestably tied to metaphysical conceptions of self, and at least has been taken as such in recent discussions on moral luck and moral responsibility. I therefore examine Rawls’ views in the context of their impact upon metaphysical discussions of the self and moral responsibility, ignoring Rawls’ retreat from metaphysical conclusions. “Rawls, A Theory of Justice p.12.
Wolff, Robert Paul In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism p.15.
Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism p.14.
Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism p.17.
For a good discussion of how many modern notions of practical autonomy are at odds with such behavior, see Dworkin, Gerald The Theory and Practice of Autonomy ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988 ), pp. 23–25.
See John Macken, S.J., The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990 ).
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May, T. (1998). The Concept of Autonomy. In: Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9030-3_3
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