Abstract
In the first section we present Reid’s distinction between the strict and proper sense of the term ‘cause’ in which it is used for an agent with power, active or speculative, and a common use of it for a physical cause, the earlier of two phenomena which invariably accompany one another. In section II we consider whether exercises of genuine speculative or active power are ruled out by adherence to Lehrer-Smith III computational models. In section III we consider reasons within Reid for the position that physical causes are not causes in the fullest sense. In section IV fundamental differences in the way cases of agent causation and of physical causation are established are set out. In section V Reid’s thoughts on final causes are considered. In section VI we face the problem of how it is to be established that someone has seen something, which Reid thinks is an exercise of power on their part. Reid emerges as a philosopher who allows for a genuine variety in manners of explanation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The Birkwood manuscript MS2131/6/I/1 suggests quite otherwise: ... There are certain Principles of Common Sens with regard to Causes which every Man of common understanding must necessarily assent to & upon which all men do act in the common concerns of Life. A Cause must be adequate to its Effect. Nor can there be any kind of real Excellence in the Effect which is not found in the Cause in a higher degree.
Especially the letters of June 14th and September 23rd 1785 from Reid to James Gregory. But note also letter XV of Hamilton’s version of the correspondence in which Reid says, Hpp75b,76a: I apprehend that there is one original notion of cause grounded in human nature, and that this is the notion on which the maxim is grounded — that every change or event must have a cause.... I conceive that, from the original notion or sentiment above described, all the different notions of cause have been derived, by some kind of analogy, or perhaps abuse;...The vulgar, in their notion even of the physical cause of a phaenomenon, include some conception of efficiency or productive influence. So all the ancient philosophers did. Modern philosophers know that we have no ground to ascribe efficiency to natural causes, or even necessary connection with the effect. But we still call them causes, including nothing under the name but priority and constant conjunction. Thus the giving the name causation to the relation of connected events in Physics, is, in modern philosophers a kind of abuse of the name, because we know that the thing most essential to causation in its proper meaning — to wit, efficiency — is wanting. Yet this does not hinder our notion of a physical cause from being distinct and determinate, though, I think, it cannot be said to be of the same genus with an efficient cause or agent.
In letter XVI of Hamilton’s version of the Gregory correspondence Reid remarks, Hpp77b,78a: As far as I can judge, to everything we call a cause we ascribe power to produce the effect. In intelligent causes, the power may be without being exerted; so I have power to run, when I sit still or walk. But in inanimate causes, we conceive no power but what is exerted; and therefore measure the power of the cause by the effect which it actually produces. The power of an acid to dissolve iron is measured by what it actually dissolves.
That this approach might prove fruitful is a suggestion I owe to A.D.Woozley, ‘Reid on Moral Liberty’, Monist Vol.70, Number 4, October 1987, pp442–52.
See the letter VIII of 23rd September 1785, Hp66a.
See the letter VII of June 14th 1785, Hp66a.
See the letter XIV of July 30th 1789, Hp74a.
In his letter to Karnes of 16th December 1780 Reid says, Hp57b: By the cause of a phenomenon, nothing is meant but the law of nature, of which that phenomenon is an instance, or a necessary consequence. The cause of a body’s falling to the ground is its gravity. But gravity is not an efficient cause, but a general law, that obtains in nature, of which law the fall of this body is a particular instance.
See the letter to Karnes of 16th December 1780 Hpp56b, 57a.
In the letter to Karnes of 16th December 1780, Hp58a, Reid says: Efficient causes, properly so called, are not within the sphere of natural philosophy. Its business is, from particular facts in the material world, to collect, by just induction, the laws that are general, and from these the more general, as far as we can go. And when this is done, natural philosophy has no more to do. It exhibits to our view the grand machine of the material world, analysed, as it were, and taken to pieces, with the connexions and dependencies of its parts, and the laws of its several movements. It belongs to another branch of philosophy to consider whether this machine is the work of chance or of design, and whether of good or bad design....
See again the letter to Karnes of 16th December 1780, Hp58b.
See the letter to Karnes of 16th December 1780 once again, in particular Hp58a,b.
See especially Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980.
See Keith Lehrer, ‘Reid on Consciousness’, Reid Studies No. 1 1986–87 pp1–9.
See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson 1949, Chapter VI, (2) Consciousness.
Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid, chapter IX, p159.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gallie, R.D. (1998). The Varieties of Causation. In: Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the Self. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 78. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9020-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9020-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5095-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9020-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive