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Two-Sorted and Intensional M-Logic

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The Logic of Intentional Objects

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 269))

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Abstract

In the previous chapter, we distinguished the second level of predication for intentional objects. The predication on this level, the external predication, has the same formal structure as we used to associate with the predication for ordinary individuals. Thus, M-objects as subjects of external predication, like individuals, are insensitive to the complexity of properties predicated of them: possessing a complex property by M-object is tantamount to its possessing simple properties in an appropriate propositional form. In particular, M-objects as subjects of external predication must be consistent and complete from the point of view of classical logic. Because of that insensitivity there is even no need to introduce complex properties to classical logic. And since M-logic comprises the classical syntax, we will utilise this fact for expressing external predication, simply by allowing constants to occupy argument positions in a (relaxed) M-language.

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Notes

  1. See Parsons [ 1980 ], Zalta [1983], [1988]. One could suggest removing the abstraction axiom for properties, in particular, not admitting complex properties. However there seems to be no philosophical reason for doing that, especially when we work within the Meinongian ontological paradigm.

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  2. Cf. Fine [1982], [1984]. M-logic based on the iterative set-theoretical semantics was discussed in Pasniczek [ 1988 ].

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  3. As a rule, these notions are not always distinguished one from another.

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  4. Cf. Aczel [1988], Barwise, Etchemendy [1987], Barwise, Moss [1990], [ 1996 ].

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  5. It seems that a similar conception is suggested by Rapaport, see Rapaport [1982].

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Paśniczek, J. (1998). Two-Sorted and Intensional M-Logic. In: The Logic of Intentional Objects. Synthese Library, vol 269. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8996-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8996-3_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4968-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8996-3

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