The Metaphorical Conception of Events and Causes: Some Implications of Cognitive Science for Philosophy
My early work was part of the first generation of Cognitive Science. First generation Cognitive Science assumed Putnam’s Functionalism, the idea that the mind could be studied independent of the body in terms of its functions, and that the mind’s functions could be represented using formal symbol systems. The meanings of the symbols were to be given by interpreting them as referring to things in the world, without any use of human imaginative capacities (e.g., metaphor, mental imagery, and prototype structure). Mind, on this conception, happened to be embodied, but embodiment played no essential role in characterizing Mind. Functionally, mind was disembodied. And imaginative capacities did not enter the picture at all. In short, First Generation Cognitive Science was the Cognitive Science of the Disembodied and Unimaginative Mind.
KeywordsTarget Domain Conceptual System Source Domain Conceptual Metaphor Love Relationship
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
- Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
- Lakoff, G. and Turner, M. (1989) More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
- Sweetser, E. (1990) From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Turner, M. (1987) Death is the Mother of Beauty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar