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Contextual Domains

  • F. Recanati
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 72)

Abstract

Natural language quantifiers often seem implicitly restricted. Thus when we say ‘The burglar took everything’, we have the feeling that ‘everything’ ranges over the domain of valuable objects in the house—not everything in the world. (In this case, it can be argued that there has to be some contextual restriction or other, for a totally unrestricted notion of ‘everything in the world’ hardly makes sense.) In the same way, someone who says ‘Most students came to the party’ is likely to have a particular group of students in mind, such that most students in that group came to the party.

Keywords

Actual World Hypothetical Situation Parent Space Complement Clause Fictional World 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • F. Recanati
    • 1
  1. 1.CREA (Ecole Polytechnique/CNRS)ParisFrance

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