Conclusion

Abstract

Assuming that logic can provide theoretical foundations for Artificial Intelligence research, this book has aimed at giving a logical analysis of two important aspects of legal reasoning which are sometimes believed to escape such an analysis: of defeasible reasoning, i.e. of reasoning with rules which are implicitly subject to exceptions, and of reasoning with inconsistent information. A secondary aim has been to clarify the role of logic in legal reasoning, particularly, to show that logic can also be useful in the analysis of noninferential kinds of reasoning, like analogical reasoning. Both aims have been satisfied, as I will summarize in this chapter. The observations on the role of logic in legal reasoning are not new: what I have mainly done is making them more specific for AI-and-law research, in order to avoid misunderstandings on the nature of my investigations. And the credits for showing that defeasible reasoning and reasoning with inconsistent information can be logically analyzed should also not go to me; my research has been a contribution to developments initiated by others, partly by applying these developments to the legal domain and partly by adding something new to the developments themselves.