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The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context pp 173–183Cite as

Cudworth Versus Descartes: Platonisme et Sens Commun dans la Critique des Méditations

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Résumé

Dans la longue succession d’argumentations qui structurent le chapitre V du True Intellectual System — A Confutation of Atheism,1 l’analyse de la preuve cartésienne de l’existence de Dieu s’avère centrale pour la cohérence du système tout entier.2 La réfutation de l’athéisme se joue sur la discussion de l’idée de Dieu, dont l’ “universalité” et la “naturalité” sont déjà par elles-mêmes le signe de la vérité. Cette vérité est rendue manifeste par le désaveu de l’athéisme: la réponse à la première objection3 des incrédules souligne le caractère contradictoire de la position de ceux qui nient qu’il existe un être intelligent self-subsistent, éternel et infini; car ceux-ci sont néanmoins obligés d’en admettre l’idée dans leur esprit pour ne pas tomber dans l’absurde de nier l’existence de rien.4 La validité et l’efficacité de la thèse soutenue par Cudworth, dans une grande partie de son oeuvre reposent sur la diffusion universelle de l’idée de Dieu, dans le temps et dans l’espace; les athées sont des théistes incohérents, des croyants manqués, qui se nient à eux-mêmes les vérités incontestables de la religion. Par cette façon assez courante de procéder dans le syncrétisme de True Intellectual System, l’erreur devient une confirmation de la vérité, un moyen par lequel cette dernière affirme sa supériorité dans l’histoire.

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Notes

  1. R. Cudworth, T.I.S. U., cf. I, V, pp. 633–899.

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  2. Sur les rapports entre Descartes et Cudworth, cf. J. C. Gregory, Cudworth and Descartes, “Philosophy”, VIII (1933), pp. 456–467;

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  3. J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth. An Interpretation, (London: Cambridge U.P., 1951), pp. 7–11 et passim;

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  4. J. E. Savenson, “Differing Reactions to Descartes among Cambridge Platonists”, Journal of the History of Ideas, XXI (1960), pp. 560–567;

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  5. D. B. Sailor, “Cudworth and Descartes”, Journal of the History of Ideas, XXIII (1962), pp. 133–140;

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  6. L. Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, (Bern: Lang, 1962);

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  7. A. Pacchi, Cartesio in Inghilterra. Da More a Boyle, (Bari: Laterza, 1973); S. Hutton, Ralph Cudworth: “God, Mind and Nature” dans R. Crocker (ed.), Reason, Religion and Nature, à paraître.

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  8. Cf. aussi S. Lamprecht, “The rôle of Descartes in Seventeenth Century England”, Studies in the History of Ideas, III (1935), pp. 181–240.

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  9. Selon cette objection, “there is no Idea of God, and therefore, either no such Thing existing in Nature, or at least no possible Evidence of it” (ibid, I, IV, i, p. 192).

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  10. Ibid. I, IV, ii, p. 194.

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  11. Ibid. I, V, p. 654.

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  12. “The belief of the existence of a God, of the natural immortality of soul, and consequently of rewards and punishments after his life, are things which the generality of mankind have no clear conception nor demonstrative science of” (R. Cudworth, T.F., X, p. 41).

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  13. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, p. 716.

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  14. Seconds Analytiques, I (A), 2, 71b.

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  15. Cf. S. Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God More Particularly in Answer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, and their Followers, (London: Botham-Knapton, 1705; réimpression anastatique, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat: Fromann Verlag, 1964), p. 28. Clarke s’était inspiré de Cudworth dans la critique de l’apriorisme cartésien, afin de prouver la supériorité de la méthode expérimentale de Newton.

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  16. Sur la preuve ontologique cartésienne en Grande-Bretagne cf. M. E. Scribano, “La prova a priori dell’esistenza di Dio nel Settecento inglese. Da Cudworth a Hume”, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, LXVIII (LXXX), 1989, pp. 184–212 ou dans L’esistenza di Dio. Storia della prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant, (Bari: Laterra, 1994),

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  17. passim, et M. Micheletti, Pascal-Butler. L’argomento ontologico. Studi sul pensiero etico-religioso inglese dei secoli XVII e XVIII, (Perugia: Benucci, 1979).

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  18. Pour l’analyse de la preuve en général cf. D. Henrich, Der ontologische Gottesbeweiss, (Tubingen, 1967).

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  19. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, p. 717; cf. R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, in Oeuvres, p.p. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols., 1969–1974, Objectiones IV, VII, p. 215.

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  20. Cf. ibid., Objectiones V, VII, p. 325.

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  21. R. Cudworth, T.F., II, p. 7.

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  22. Ibid., XVIII, p. 66.

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  23. Ibid., XIV, p. 49.

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  24. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., I, III, 8, pp. 36–37.

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  25. Ibid., I, III, 4, pp. 32–33.

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  26. Cudworth n’analyse que la preuve cartésienne dite a prori: il ne s’intéresse pas à la démonstration de Dieu que Descartes avait exposée dans la Méditation III; à propos de cette argumentation Descartes avait écrit: “considerationem causae efficientis esse primum et praecipuum medium, ne dicam unicum, quod habeamus ad existentiam Dei probandam, puto omnibus esse manifestum” (R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, op. cit., IV Responsiones, VII, p. 238). Puisque Cudworth ne s’arrête pas sur la discussion cartésienne concernant le rapport entre l’idée et sa cause, on peut mieux comprendre l’accusation qu’il adresse au philosophe français d’avoir sombré dans le vice du cercle.

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  27. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., I, III, 3, pp. 30–31.

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  28. Ibid., I, III, 3, p. 31.

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  29. Ibid., IV, V, 2, p. 265.

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  30. Ibid., IV, VI, 1, p. 284.

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  31. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, p. 719.

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  32. R. Descartes, Meditationes, op. cit., Objectiones III, p. 178; cf. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, III, 15, p. 225)

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  33. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, V, 5, p. 272.

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  34. Cf. A. Pacchi, Cartesio in Inghilterra. Da More a Boyle, op. cit., p. 185; selon Pacchi, l’idéalisme de Cudworth est objectif parce qu’il est “tutto teso a rilevare l’esistenza di una verità che trascende anche la volontà di Dio, identificandosi con gli intelligibili presenti nella sua mente”.

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  35. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., I, III, 7, p. 36.

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  36. Cf. ibid., IV, IV, 65, p. 248: les Rationes “have a Constant Being, when our Particular Created Minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they are immutable in another Sense likewise, not only because they are Indivisibly the same when we think of them, but also because they have a Constant and never-failing Entity; and always are, whether our Particulars Minds think of them or not”.

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  37. Ibid., V, VI, 2, p. 285.

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  38. Ibid. Dans l’Entretien avec Burman, Descartes écrivait: “essentia ante existentiam non fuit, cum existentia nihil sit aliud quam essentia existens, ut proinde unum altero non prius, nec ab eo diversum aut distinctum” (Oeuvres, op. cit., p. 164).

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  39. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, VI, 2, pp. 284–285.

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  40. Ibid., IV, VI, 2, p. 285.

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  41. R. Cudworth, T.F., XIV, p. 50.

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  42. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, VI, 2, p. 284.

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  43. R. Cudworth, T.F., p. 50.

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  44. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, p. 720.

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  45. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, VI, 4, p. 287. Sur le problème des idées innées chez Cudworth et le platonisme de Cambridge, cf. J. W. Yolton, John Locke and the Ways of Ideas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), qui montre la diffusion du concept de “prolepsis”, ou “preassumed notion”, depuis la seconde décade du XVIIe siècle en Grande-Bretagne.

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  46. Voir aussi R. L. Armstrong, “Cambridge Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas”, Journal of the History of Ideas, XXX (1969), pp. 187–202;

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  47. R. McRae, “Idea as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century”, Journal of the History of Ideas, XXVI (1965), n. 2, pp. 175–190.

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  48. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., III, III, 4, p. 97.

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  49. Ibid., III, III, 1, pp. 93–94. Sur les idées en tant que “anticipations”, cf. J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth. An Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 37–39 et L. Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, op. cit., pp. 33 ss.

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  50. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, II, 11, p. 172; 13, p. 178; 7, p. 160.

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  51. Ibid., IV, II, 15, p. 183.

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  52. C’est la “Interiour Simmetry and Harmony in the Relations, Proportions, Aptitudes and Correspondencies of Things to one another in the Great Mundane System, or Vital Machine of the Universe, which is all Musically and Harmonically composed; for which Cause the Antients made Pan, that is Nature to play upon an Harp” (ibid., IV, II, 15, p. 184).

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  53. Ibid., IV, III, 1, pp. 189–190.

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  54. Ibid., IV, III, 3, pp. 192–193.

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  55. Ibid., IV, III, 3, p. 195.

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  56. Ibid., IV, III, 3, p. 194.

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  57. Ibid., IV, III, 6, p. 200.

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  58. Ibid., IV, III, 9, p. 209.

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  59. Ibid., IV, III, 4, p. 195.

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  60. Epistola Prima H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, in H. More, Opera Omnia, II, 2, p. 235.

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  61. Chez More, on ne peut pas connaître les essences (cf. Epistola Secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, in H. More, Opera Omnia, op. cit., Ad Responsum circa primam Difficultatem, Instantia l, II, 2, p. 243: “cum radix rerum omnium ac essentia in aeternas defossa lateat tenebras”): il définit le corps “ab habitudine aliqua”, qui “proprietas dici potest in substantiis, cum non sit substantia” (ibid.). Attendu que cette “habitudo” n’est évidenment pas “res absoluta” (ibid.), on peut réfuter la nécessité de la matière, que Descartes affirme, selon More, en identifiant l’extension avec l’essence.

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  62. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, pp. 638–639.

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  63. Sur ce sujet, ainsi que sur la théorie de la connaissance de Cudworth, cf. M. Baldi, “Il ‘vero sistema’ dell’universo e il conflitto delle tradizioni in Cudworth”, dans G. Canziani et Ch. Y. Zarka (cur.), L’interpretazione nei secoli XVI e XVII, (Milano: Angeli, 1993), pp. 183–206.

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  64. Voir R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, op. cit., II, p. 32: “nisi jam forte respexissem ex fenetra homines in platea transeuntes, quos etiam ipsos non minus usitate quam ceram dico me videre. Quid autem video praeter pileos et vestes, sub quibus latere possent automata? Sed judico homines esse”; cf. R. Cudworth, T.I.S. U., III, III, 3, p. 96: “Just as when a Man looking down out of a Window into the Streets, is said to see Men walking in the Streets, when indeed he perceives nothing but Hats and Cloaths, under which, for ought he knows, there may be Daedalean Statues moving up and down”. Les emprunts à Descartes sont soulignés par J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth. An Interpretation, op. cit.

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  65. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, III, 13, p. 214. Cudworth aussi la similitude du bâton de Descartes (Dioptrique, Discours Premier, Œuvres, op. cit., VI, pp. 83–86): “in the same manner as we feel things at a Distance in the Dark, by the Resistency which they make upon the further end of the Staff that we hold in our hands” (R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., op. cit., III, I, 2, p. 77).

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  66. Ibid., IV, III, 13, p. 215; cf. R. Descartes, Le Monde ou Traité de la lumière, Oeuvres, op. cit., IX, p. 4 et La Dioptrique, Discours IV, Ibid., VI, p. 112.

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  67. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, III, 13, pp. 217–218.

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  68. “And here we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient atomical Philosophy, so succesfully revived of late by Cartesius, in that it shews distinctly what Matter is, and what it can amount unto, namely, nothing else but what may be produced from meer Magnitude, Figure, Site, local Motion and Rest; from whence it is demonstrably evident and mathematically certain, that no Cogitation can possibly arise out of the Power of Matter” (R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M., IV, VI, 15, pp. 301–302); sur l’atomisme en Angleterre, cf. R. H. Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

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  69. Sur le scepticisme chez Cudworth, cf. R. H. Popkin, “The Crisis of Politheism and the Answers of Vossius, Cudworth and Newton”, dans J. E. Forces and R. H. Popkin (eds.), Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theology, (Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1990), pp. 9–25; maintenant dans The Third Force in Seveenteenth Century Thought, (Brill: Leiden, 1992), pp. 334–350. Selon Popkin, Cudworth “used a semi-scepticism and a commonsense Platonism to rebut the overall attack of Hobbes and Spinoza, thereby ‘justifying’ the appeal to universal religion based on an innate conception of an infinite deity” (ibid., p. 349).

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  70. R. Cudworth, T.E.I.M, IV, III, 7, p. 204.

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  71. Ibid., IV, III, 12, p. 213.

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  72. Ibid. IV, V, 4, p. 271.

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  73. Ibid. IV, V, 4, 271.

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  74. R. Cudworth, T.I.S.U., I, V, pp. 639.

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Authors
  1. Marialuisa Baldi
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Keele, Keele, UK

    G. A. J. Rogers

  2. Université de Nantes, France

    J. M. Vienne

  3. CNRS Paris, France

    Y. C. Zarka

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Baldi, M. (1997). Cudworth Versus Descartes: Platonisme et Sens Commun dans la Critique des Méditations . In: Rogers, G.A.J., Vienne, J.M., Zarka, Y.C. (eds) The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 150. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8933-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8933-8_12

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