Abstract
In one way or another, the papers in this volume investigate the intersection and interaction of defeasible reasoning and normative reasoning. Various notions from normative reasoning, including the notions of prima facie obligation, contrary-to-duty obligations, and moral dilemmas have raised serious problems for deontic logicians, problems which have defied solution within standard deontic logic and its extensions. As a result, deontic logic has fallen into ill-repute with those who must actually engage in normative reasoning. An underlying thesis of this volume is that nonmonotonic or defeasible methods may provide the way to solve some of these thorny problems. A defeasible deontic logic may not only solve some of the familiar paradoxes of deontic logic, but may actually be attractive to moral philosophers, jurists, and others who would seem to be the natural clients of the deontic logician.
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Nute, D., Yu, X. (1997). Introduction. In: Nute, D. (eds) Defeasible Deontic Logic. Synthese Library, vol 263. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_1
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