Freedom, Responsibility and Judgment
The interest in a Heideggerian ethics was first suggested by Charles Sherover in 1972, but has only really received an impetus first from Daniel Dahlstrom and then most recently and most substantively from Frank Schalow in his important and influential study, The Renewal of the Heidegger-Kant Dialogue (Sherover 1972, Dahlstrom 1991, Schalow 1992). For all three the starting point, if only as an immediate symbol, is Heidegger’s oft-cited comments made in the spring of 1928: ‘Some years ago, as I studied the Kritik der reinen Vernunft anew and read it against the backdrop of Husserl’s phenomenology, it as, as it were, as though the scales fell from my eyes and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the rightness of the path on which I searched.’ (Dahlstrom 1991, p.329). It is generally recognised that the Kantian turn prefigured Heidegger’s ensuing Nietzschean turn, which was an attempt to jump the ‘abyss’ from which he had perceived Kant to have recoiled.
KeywordsPolitical Philosophy Moral Person Participatory Democracy Critical Philosophy German People
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