Abstract
A basic objective of choice theory is obvious—we want to find an election procedure in which outcomes accurately reflect the “true” views of voters. In the quest for such a procedure positional voting methods have been widely employed and studied. They are easy to use and they also define a natural way to model the beliefs of voters, because they assign weights to voters’ rankings of candidates.
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Saari, D.G. (1996). Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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