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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to provide a brief introduction to choice function approaches that examine Arrow’s impossibility result. In Arrow’s original formulation, the problem was to aggregate individual preferences into group preferences, while assuming that both individual and group preferences remained transitive and complete. It has long been recognized, however, that the transitivity of preferences is a strong assumption and in the theory of social choice less demanding properties are argued to be more reasonable.

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References

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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Xu, Y. (1996). Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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