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Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches

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Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

Abstract

Many students of political economy have stressed the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Empirical studies seem to confirm this alleged importance. These studies, however, typically focus on the relationship between the presence and characteristics of groups, on the one hand, and the policies that result on the other hand, leaving out the behavior and interaction in between;1 in this respect they resemble the structure-performance approach in industrial organisation. Neglected are the determinants of the level and kind of activities of groups and the explanation of the influence of these activities on public policy.

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Authors
  1. Jan Potters
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  2. Frans van Winden
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Washington University in St. Louis, USA

    Norman Schofield (William Taussig Professor of Political Economy) (William Taussig Professor of Political Economy)

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Potters, J., van Winden, F. (1996). Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

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