Abstract
Axelrod (1970) introduced the idea of connected coalitions in one dimension. Grofman (1982) provided a straightforward generalization of that idea to the multidimensional case and offered a multistage model of protocoalition formation in an m-dimensional ideological space which gave rise to the prediction of a unique m-connected winning coalition.
This research was supported by NSF Grant SES-85-06376, Decision and Management Sciences, to the first-named author. We are indebted to Dorothy Gormick for bibliographic assistance. We are especially indebted to Amnon Rapoport for making the raw data of his Israeli study available to us. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on European Cabinet Coalition Formation, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, May 24–29, 1987.
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Grofman, B., Straffin, P., Noviello, N. (1996). The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_13
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