Abstract
This is a position paper or trailer for a larger work in progress and having the same title. My hypothesis is that the world is a world of states of affairs. I think that I am saying the same thing as those who have held that the world is a world of facts not things. So it may be in order to begin by saying why I use the phrase ‘state of affairs’ rather than the word ‘fact’. This is all the more in order because it is customary among those who patronize facts to use ‘state of affairs’ to mean no more than possible fact. My states of affairs, however, are all existents.
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References
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Armstrong, D.M. (1996). A World of States of Affairs. In: Poli, R., Simons, P. (eds) Formal Ontology. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 53. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5
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