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Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontology

Chapter
Part of the Nijhoff International Philosophy Series book series (NIPS, volume 53)

Abstract

A formal ontology is both a theory of logical form and a metaphysical theory about the ontological structure of the world. What makes it a theory of logical form is that different ontological categories or modes of being are represented in it by different logico-grammatical categories. It is specified in this regard by what might be called an ontological grammar that determines how the expressions of those logico-grammatical categories can be meaningfully combined so as to represent different ontological aspects of the world.

Keywords

Natural Kind Natural Property Formal Ontology Intensional Object Predicate Variable 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

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