Abstract
In the opening three sections of the Disputatio Leibniz examines the “state of the question” and makes it clear that he intends to argue for a principle of individuation that is internal to, or constitutive of, individual entities. He makes an important distinction between the logical and metaphysical senses of ‘individual’. Leibniz does not provide his reader with much information on how he might have understood this distinction. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to setting out a plausible interpretation of the distinction, based on general features of Aristotelian philosophy, with which Leibniz was familiar. Doing so provides an adequate basis for interpreting the basic features of individuals and their individuation that occupied Leibniz in his earliest philosophy — and that persist in his mature philosophy.
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Notes
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individi,in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften and Briefe,Sechste Reihe, Erste Band (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1930) p.11: “1. Quanto latius argumentum nostrum diffisum est, verbo vero pauciora esse debent, tanto magis abstinendum nobis a praefatione esset, nisi admoneret Divino Numini debita invocatio. DEUM igitur, primum actum fontemque secundorum, oramus obtestamurque, ut cujus in re ipsa causa est, ejus quoque in nostra cogitione suscitator esse velit, ne quicquam cuiquam nisi ipsi bonitatis debeamus.
Ante omnium autem statum quaestionis excutiemus. Acturi igitur sumus de Principio Individui, ubi et Principium et Individuum varie accipitur. Et quod Individuum attinet, quemadmodum Universale, sic ipsum quoque vel Logicom est in ordine ad praedicationem; vel Metaphysicum in ordine ad rem. Atque sic rursum aut prout in re est, aut prout in conceptu, seu ut alii exprimunt formaliter aut fundamentaliter: Et formaliter vel de individuo omni vel creato tantum vel substantia tantum vel substantia materiali. Principii quoque vox notat turn cognescendi principium, turn essendi. Essendi intermum et extemum. Quare ut haec colligam, agemus de aliquo reali, et, ut loquuntur principio Physico, quod rationis individui formalis seu individuationis, seu differentiae numericae in intellectu sit fundamentum, idque in individuis praecipue creatis substantialis.
Quoniam vero, ut attritu sicilis scintillae emicant; ita commissione sententiarum veritas detegitur, age primum eas digeremus. Sunt autem duo genera opinionum; alii hypotheses habuere ad omnia individua applicabiles, ut Scotus, alii secus, ut Thomas, qui in corporibus materiam signatam, in Angelis eorum entitatem principium posuit. Nos quoniam hic abstrehemus a substantia materiali et immateriali, speciales opiniones alio tempore consideraturi, nunc generates tantum excutiemus. Quas praecipue quatuor numerare licet. Aut enim Principium Individuationis ponitur entitas tota (1), aut non totam. Non totam aut Negatio exprimit (2), aut aliquid positivum. Positivum hoc aut pars Physica est essentiam terminans, Existentia (3); aut Metaphysica speciem terminans, Haecceitas (4).
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Leroy E. Loemker ( Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969 ), p. 307.
ibid.
Gottfried Martin, Leibniz, Logic, and Metaphysics, trans. K.J. Northcott and P.G. Lucas (New York, NY: Barnes and Noble, 1960), p. 182. Reprinted in series, The Philosophy of Leibniz, ed., R.C. Sleigh ( New York, NY: Garland Publishing Co., 1985 ).
J.L. Ackrill, trans., Aristotle:s Categories and de Interpretatione (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 4. In Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984 ), Volume I, p. 3.
Ignacio Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy (Dordrecht, Hol-land: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1967 ).
Jorge I.E. Garcia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich, Federal Republic of Germany: Philosophia Verlag, 1984) and Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (Munich, Federal Republic of Germany: Philosophia Verlag, 1988 ). Gracia’s analysis in the second edition of this work is essentially unchanged from the first edition. Subsequent citations are to the more recent, second edition.
ibid., p. 19.
ibid., p. 20.
ibid., p. 21.
ibid., p. 22.
ibid., p. 26.
ibid., p. 27.
ibid.
ibid., p. 29.
ibid., pp. 31–32.
ibid., pp. 32–33.
ibid., pp. 33–34.
ibid., p. 34.
ibid., p. 35.
ibid., p. 36.
See ibid., pp. 42–45.
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McCullough, L.B. (1996). Individuals and Individuation in the Disputatio . In: Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8684-9_2
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