Normative Reasonings and Default Assumptions

  • Irina Gerasimova
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 257)


The very availability of patterns and standards of mental activities rooted in social experience allows us to reduce detailed analysis in every particular case of individual thinking and use the implicit and tacit mechanisms of cognizing. This specific feature of human thinking lies in the basis of so called reasonings by default. In everyday life a man often makes inferences according to certain rules if there are no specific indications or exceptions to these rules.


Data Block Normative Reasoning Epistemic Logic Propositional Formula Epistemic Norm 
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    A. Hautamäki. Epistemic Logic and Default Reasoning in Knowledge-Based System, Helsinki, Manuscript, 1987.Google Scholar
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    E. D. Smirnova. Logicheskaya Semantika i Philosophskie Osnovaniya Logiki, Moskwa, 1986, s. 93–101.Google Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

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  • Irina Gerasimova

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