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Conditional Intentions

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 257)

Abstract

In the Third Finnish-Soviet Logic Symposium, organised in Helsinki in May 1983, I presented a paper with the title Hypothetical Imperatives and Conditional Obligations [14]. My main idea was to analyse hypothetical imperatives (‘Do p if q!’) in analogy with conditional bets, and thereby to argue that the logical form of conditional obligations, created through successful imperatives, can in a natural way be represented by an intensional conditional sentence (‘If it were q, then it ought to be p’).1

Keywords

Deontic Logic Imperative Operator Material Implication Conditional Belief Rational Appetite 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto

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