Abstract
When Brentano adapted the notion of intentionality from medieval philosophy he had three purposes in mind:
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(1)
the definition of psychology as an independent and objective science alongside physiology
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(2)
the justification of a dualism of physical and psychological phenomena
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(3)
a new and systematic classification of psychological phenomena.
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Brandl, J. (1996). Intentionality. In: Albertazzi, L., Libardi, M., Poli, R. (eds) The School of Franz Brentano. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8676-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8676-4_10
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