Abstract
In his Presidential Address at the 1990 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) in Minneapolis, Thomas S. Kuhn announced his project of writing a philosophical book on realism and truth. The audience included also members of the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S). To the disappointment of many sociologists of science, who have taken Kuhn as an authority in their campaign for relativist and anti-realist views, Kuhn now argued that the concept of incommensurability is in fact needed “to defend notions like truth and knowledge from, for example, the excesses of post-modernist movements like the strong program”.1 A “strong concept of truth” is needed, he argued, to understand the “normal rules of evidence” for accepting or rejecting theories.2
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ellis, B. (1988). ‘Internal Realism’, Synthese 76, pp. 409–434.
Field, H. (1982). ‘Realism and Relativism’, The Journal of Philosophy 79, pp. 553–567.
Grim, P. (1991). The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge and Truth. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hintikka, J. (1975). The Intentions of Intentionality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Hintikka, J. and M. B. (1989). ‘Toward a General Theory of Individuation and Identification’, in The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 73–95.
Horwich, P. (1990). Truth, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kuhn, T. S. (1990). ‘The Road Since Structure’, in A. Fine et al. (eds.), PSA 1990, vol. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, MI, 1991, pp. 3–13.
Kusch, M. (1991). ‘Koko totuus totuudesta’, Tiede ja edistys 16:4, pp. 284–297.
Niiniluoto, I. (1980). ‘Scientific Progress’, Synthese 45, pp. 427–464.
Niiniluoto, I. (1984). Is Science Progressive?, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Niiniluoto, I. (1987a). Truthlikeness, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Niiniluoto, I. (1987b). ‘The Varieties of Realism’, in P. Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt (eds.), Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1987, World Scientific, Singapore, pp. 459–483.
Niiniluoto, I. (1991). ‘Realism, Relativism, and Constructivism’, Synthese 89, pp. 135–162.
Putnam, H. (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putnam, H. (1990). Realism with Human Face, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rescher, N. (1982). Conceptual Idealism, University Press of America, Washington, D.C.
Sellars, W. (1968). Science and Metaphysics. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Tuomela, R. (1985). Science, Action and Reality. D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Tuomela, R. (1990). ‘Causal Internal Realism’, in G. Pasternack (ed.), Philosophie und Wissenschaften, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 165–179.
Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Walker, R. C. S. (1989). The Coherence Theory of Truth, Routledge, London.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Niiniluoto, I. (1996). Queries about Internal Realism. In: Cohen, R.S., Hilpinen, R., Renzong, Q. (eds) Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 169. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4493-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8638-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive