Abstract
In this paper, I muse very briefly on realism and constructivism not simply as conceptual or philosophical alternatives in the interpretation of the relation between theoretical knowledge and its object, but rather as philosophical articulations of historically different modes of scientific practice, in which the relations between knower and known are in fact different.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Wartofsky, M.W. (1996). Three Stages of Constitution: Historical Changes in the Ontological Status of the Scientific Object. In: Cohen, R.S., Hilpinen, R., Renzong, Q. (eds) Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 169. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4493-8
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