Abstract
The use of argument by innuendo to cast aspersions, doubts, and misgivings, has generally had a borderline status as a legitimate subject for study in logic. We know that, practically speaking, this kind of argumentation is very powerful and also very common in everyday conversation. But pinning such a practice down as some sort of fallacy or incorrect argument has appeared to be an elusive project. After all, if premises and conclusions are not clearly or explicitly asserted in this kind of argumentation, how can we detect and evaluate specific instances of failure to present valid or correct arguments?
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References
See Walton [1989b, p. 270] and [1989a].
Fearnside and Holther [1959, p. 104].
CBS News Transcript, 60 Minutes, vol. 23, no. 28, March 24, 1991, pp. 17–18.
Walton [1989a].
Philosophy, as a field, would be in plenty of trouble, if there were anything inherently wrong with these speech acts.
The monograph, Commitment in Dialogue [Walton and Krabbe, 1995] tackles this general problem.
Brinton [1986].
A summary précis [not quoted verbatim] of the CBS News Report ‘Presumed Guilty’ televised on 20–20, July 5, 1991.
On argumentation schemes generally, see Hastings [1962], and van Eemeren and Kruiger [1987].
Grice [1975].
An exception to this traditional concentration is found in the theory of plausible reasoning put forward in Rescher [1976; 1977]. Rescher’s theory explains how shifts in presumptions at a local level of dialogue can be based on an initial or global burden of proof. The concept of burden of proof is further explained in Walton [1988].
Hastings [1962] recognized argument from sign as an argumentation scheme.
On the importance of such contextual factors in argumentation, see Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca [1969].
See Grice [1975].
See Hamblin [1970, p. 1781
Hamblin [1970, p. 160]. The only other fallacy more closely connected to argument by innuendo is the argumentum ad ignorantiam. See [Walton, 19961
Hinman [1982].
Walton [1989b].
Walton [1989a].
Walton [1989a].
See Krabbe [1990] on inconsistency of commitment.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Walton, D. (1996). Innuendo. In: Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity. Applied Logic Series, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8632-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8632-0_6
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