Indifference and Induction

  • Len O’neill
Part of the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 12)


Many find that there are at least some situations in which the notorious Principle of Indifference provides a reasonable basis for a distribution of probabilities, construed as degrees of confidence. For example, knowing only that there is a bean in one of three boxes, but ignorant of any information as to which box it is in, the only reasonable distribution of degrees of confidence, is a uniform one of 1/3 to each possibility. It is the purpose of this paper to consider what might be offered by way of a rationale for the principle and how two objections to the principle might be handled.


Epistemic Attitude Dutch Book Empirical Reasoning Innate Capacity Dutch Book Argument 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Len O’neill
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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