Indifference and Induction
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Many find that there are at least some situations in which the notorious Principle of Indifference provides a reasonable basis for a distribution of probabilities, construed as degrees of confidence. For example, knowing only that there is a bean in one of three boxes, but ignorant of any information as to which box it is in, the only reasonable distribution of degrees of confidence, is a uniform one of 1/3 to each possibility. It is the purpose of this paper to consider what might be offered by way of a rationale for the principle and how two objections to the principle might be handled.
KeywordsEpistemic Attitude Dutch Book Empirical Reasoning Innate Capacity Dutch Book Argument
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