Abstract
The ontology of analytic metaphysics consists primarily of fundamental properties and relations. This ontology is variously enriched with a variety of metaphysical apparatus, ranging from supervenient relations, possible world accessibility relations, through to primitive causal powers that determine physical behaviour. The role of such metaphysical additions is to augment the ontology to yield a fully fledged metaphysics that can explain the nature of the world.
I would like to thank David Armstrong and an anonymous referee for help useful comments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Armstrong, D. M., (1978) Universals and Scientific Realism, (2 vols.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1983) What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1989) A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Beckermann, A., et. al (eds.), (1992) Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin, de Gruytef.
Bigelow, J. C., Ellis, B. D. and Lierse, C. (1992) The World as one of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43, 371–388.
Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1994) ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, 27–45.
Fales, E. (1986) ‘Essentialism and the Elementary Constituents of Matter’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11,391–402.
Fales, E. (1990) Causation and Universals, London, Routledge.
Harré, R. (1970) ‘Powers’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21, 81–101.
Harré, R., and Madden, E. H. (1973) ‘Natural Powers and Powerful Natures’, Philosophy 48, 209–230.
Harré, R., and Madden, E. H. (1975) Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Oxford, Blackwell.
Lewis, D. K. (1983a) ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, 343–377.
Lewis, D. K. (1983b) ‘Extrinsic Properties’, Philosophical Studies 44, 197–200.
Lewis, D. K. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Schlesinger, G. (1963) Method in the Physical Sciences, London, Routledge.
Shoemaker, S. (1980) ‘Causality and Properties’ in P. van Inwagen (ed), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Dordrecht, Reidel, pp. 109–135.
Swoyer, C. (1982) ‘The Nature of Natural Laws’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60, 203–223.
Teller, P. (1984) ‘A Poor Man’s Guide to Supervenience and Determination’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement to Volume 22, pp. 137–162.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lierse, C. (1996). The Jerrybuilt House of Humeanism. In: Riggs, P.J. (eds) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4750-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8607-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive