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The Jerrybuilt House of Humeanism

  • Caroline Lierse
Chapter
Part of the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 12)

Abstract

The ontology of analytic metaphysics consists primarily of fundamental properties and relations. This ontology is variously enriched with a variety of metaphysical apparatus, ranging from supervenient relations, possible world accessibility relations, through to primitive causal powers that determine physical behaviour. The role of such metaphysical additions is to augment the ontology to yield a fully fledged metaphysics that can explain the nature of the world.

Keywords

Causal Power Natural Property Dispositional Property Identity Criterion Causal Criterion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Caroline Lierse
    • 1
  1. 1.La Trobe UniversityBundooraAustralia

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