Abstract
A private language, in the context of other minds, is a language that is logically impossible for anyone other than its user to understand. It is claimed that such a “language” is impossible. What has this to do with the problem of other minds?
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Notes to Chapter Six
Robinson Krusoe is the supposed speaker of the logically private “language”.
See the comments on Malcolm in Chapter Five.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1953) Paragraph 258.
Norman Malcolm, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’ in V.C. Chappell (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1962) pp. 74–100. See p. 76.
Op. cit., Paragraph 293.
A.J. Ayer, ‘The concept of a person’ in The Concept of a Person (Macmillan, 1963). See pp. 106–8.
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hyslop, A. (1995). The “Old” Private Language Argument and Other Minds. In: Other Minds. Synthese Library, vol 246. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8510-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8510-1_7
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