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Other Minds pp 71-91 | Cite as

Criteria and Other Minds

  • Alec Hyslop
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 246)

Abstract

The analogical inference to other minds has competitors other than the scientific inference to other minds. They all seem to me to fail. I shall examine them successively beginning with that “approach” to other minds which depends on the notion of criteria. The classical role of criteria in epistemology has, indeed, been to justify belief in other minds. Often this has proceeded in two stages. First the analogical inference to other minds is attacked and thoroughly discredited thereby exposing a vacuum. Criteria are then invoked to fill this vacuum. Given that there is such a strategy, the consequent urgency of the need has, I think, been responsible for the fact that criteria have been rushed in without due care and attention. This chapter will give them that due care and attention.

Keywords

Inductive Inference Deductive Inference Conceptual Connection Criterial Evidence Analogical Inference 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes to Chapter Five

  1. 1.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alec Hyslop
    • 1
  1. 1.La Trobe UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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