Other Minds pp 15-27 | Cite as

Who Has the Problem of Other Minds?

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 246)


Who has the other minds problem? Are there views of the human mind that avoid the problem? Those who believe that people are more than complex (physico-chemical) machines, are more than complex aggregates of sub-atomic particles which have only material properties, have non-material properties as well as material properties, certainly have the problem. So all Dualist views of the nature of human beings have the problem. So clearly do Idealist views, believing there are only minds and their ideas.


Mental State Human Mind Brain State Phenomenal Property Direct Knowledge 
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Notes to Chapter Two

  1. 1.
    D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (Routledge, 1968) p. 125.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.La Trobe UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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