Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship between the credit market structure and the existence of a white and/or black credit register. A black register compiles historical information and no on-line information, as is the case in a white register. Banks enter the market via a two-stage procedure: given they entered, they decide about their number of outlets. We show that in the white register case more but smaller banks arise than under the black register. These findings are tested using a simultaneous equation model. The evidence shows that the model performs fairly well.
We are grateful to L. Bettendorf, T. Gehrig and the participants of the workshops at the K.U. Leuven, the EARIE 1992 conference in Stuttgart and the EEA 1992 conference in Dublin. The second author acknowledges the financial support of F.K.F.O. nr. 2.0073.90.
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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van Cayseele, P., Bouckaert, J., Degryse, H. (1995). Credit Market Structure and Information Sharing Mechanisms. In: van Witteloostuijn, A. (eds) Market Evolution. Studies in Industrial Organization, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8428-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8428-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4523-2
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