Abstract
Is reassurance an effective tool in the maintenance of proliferation stability? The question is studied by means of a simplified simulation model, in which proliferatory moves are decided by cost/benefit considerations, according to a utility function. One participant, called Stabilizer, is ready to reassure potential proliferators by offering a predetermined package, the blocking-payment, designed to encourage them to maintain the status-quo. A conceptual analysis of the model reveals certain weaknesses of reassurance, such as extortion and positive feedback. A quantitative simulation shows, rather surprisingly, that reassurance plays a limited role in combatting proliferation, as long as the costs and payments involved are reasonable. Still, reassurance is important, because no alternative mechanism seems more promising, given a non-belligerent, multi-polar world (with a leading superpower)
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Amit, I. (1995). Stability, Reassurance and Non-Proliferation. In: Best, M.L., Hughes-Wilson, J., Piontkowsky, A.A. (eds) Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament. NATO ASI Series, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8396-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8396-1_22
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