Abstract
In its final report to the U.S. Congress on section 319 of the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that “...information indicates very clearly that nonpoint source pollution has caused severe damage to aquatic communities nationwide and has destroyed the aesthetic values of many of our treasured recreational waters” [USEPA (1992, p. 1–2)1. The report contends that 16 percent (206,179 miles) of the rivers in 40 surveyed states and 20 percent (5.4 million surface acres) of the lakes have been impacted. The largest culprits remain nutrients, toxins, and siltation from agricultural and urban runoff. The report concludes by stressing the need to use the power of market incentives to efficiently prevent and control these nonpoint source (NPS) pollutants. By unleashing market forces, nonpoint pollution can be reduced in the most costeffective way, thereby freeing resources to address other important problems.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Govindasamy, R., Herriges, J.A., Shogren, J.F. (1994). Nonpoint Tournaments. In: Dosi, C., Tomasi, T. (eds) Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis. Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8346-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8346-6_4
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