How to Model Relational Belief Revision

  • Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
  • Sten Lindström
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)


Some years ago, we proposed a generalization of the well-known approach to belief revision due to Peter Gärdenfors (cf. Gärdenfors 1988). According to him, for each theory G (i.e., each set of propositions closed under logical consequence) and each proposition A, there is a unique theory, G*A, which would be the result of revising G with A as new piece of information. There is a unique theory which would constitute the revision of G with A. Thus, belief revision is seen as a function. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories. The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. If G and H are theories, and A is a proposition, then GRAH is to be read as: H is an admissible revision of G with A. (Cf. Lind-ström and Rabinowicz, 1989 and 1990.)


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
    • 1
  • Sten Lindström
    • 1
  1. 1.Uppsala UniversitySweden

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