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The Alleged Autonomy of Psychology and the Social Sciences

  • Anne Ruth Mackor
Chapter
  • 132 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)

Abstract

In the philosophy of mind, several prominent philosophers (Davidson, Fodor and Searle among others) defend the thesis that psychology and the social sciences are autonomous in a strong sense. They argue that there can be no type-identity between mental and physical terms. They also argue that there can be no strict laws and consequently no deductive-nomological explanations in psychology and the social sciences.

Keywords

Proper Function Functional Explanation Chemical Phenomenon Computational Explanation Social Item 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anne Ruth Mackor
    • 1
  1. 1.University of GroningenThe Netherlands

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