The Alleged Autonomy of Psychology and the Social Sciences
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In the philosophy of mind, several prominent philosophers (Davidson, Fodor and Searle among others) defend the thesis that psychology and the social sciences are autonomous in a strong sense. They argue that there can be no type-identity between mental and physical terms. They also argue that there can be no strict laws and consequently no deductive-nomological explanations in psychology and the social sciences.
KeywordsProper Function Functional Explanation Chemical Phenomenon Computational Explanation Social Item
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