Holes in the Role Argument
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John Earman and John Norton claim that modern spacetime realists (substantivalists) face a new problem: a realist can’t also be a determinist. They argue this both separately (Earman 1989, Norton 1987) and together, notably, in Earman and Norton 1987. The problem has been tackled here and there, mainly in attempts to find a picture of determinism which evades the problem. (Butterfield 1987, 1989, Maudlin 1988).
KeywordsSpatial Relation Constant Curvature Absolute Space Spacetime Theory Metaphysical Argument
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