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Holes in the Role Argument

  • Graham Nerlich
Chapter
  • 131 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)

Abstract

John Earman and John Norton claim that modern spacetime realists (substantivalists) face a new problem: a realist can’t also be a determinist. They argue this both separately (Earman 1989, Norton 1987) and together, notably, in Earman and Norton 1987. The problem has been tackled here and there, mainly in attempts to find a picture of determinism which evades the problem. (Butterfield 1987, 1989, Maudlin 1988).

Keywords

Spatial Relation Constant Curvature Absolute Space Spacetime Theory Metaphysical Argument 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham Nerlich
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AdelaideAustralia

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