The Limits of Formalization

  • Sören Stenlund
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)


There are two fundamentally different attitudes to the methods of formal logic in the logical tradition at least since Frege. On one hand, a logical formalization of some part of mathematics, or some other domain, is meant to articulate conceptually essential features of that domain as it exists. The formalization is fundamentally the result of a conceptual investigation, and not just the application of a certain technique for transforming informal notions into formal ones. Logical analysis is clarification of given concepts and conceptual relationships. And in this conception of logic, it is taken for granted that logical and conceptual problems, arising in some domain, concern something about which one can be absolutely right or wrong.


Logical System Conceptual Problem Conceptual Content Conceptual Investigation Conceptual Relationship 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sören Stenlund
    • 1
  1. 1.Uppsala UniversitySweden

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