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Taking Belief Bases Seriously

  • Sven Ove Hansson
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)

Abstract

The dynamics of (rational) belief has been one of the most expansive subjects in philosophical logic in the last decade. Much of the inspiration for this development was provided by Levi (1980) and by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (the AGM model, Alchourrón et al. 1985 and Gärdenfors 1988). Following these authors, most workers in this field have employed models in which a state of belief is represented by a set of sentences that is closed under logical consequence.1 However, it was observed by Alchourrón and Makinson (1982, p. 21) that “the intuitive processes [of belief change] themselves, contrary to casual impressions, are never really applied to theories as a whole, but rather to more or less clearly identified bases for them.” (Cf. also Makinson 1987, p. 384.) In the last few years, formal properties of operations on bases have been investigated by Fuhrmann (1991), Hansson (1989, 1991, 1992a–c, 1993a–c), Nebel (1989, 1992), Nayak (1991), and Rott (1993a–b).

Keywords

Logical Consequence Belief Revision Belief State Belief Base Belief Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sven Ove Hansson
    • 1
  1. 1.Uppsala UniversitySweden

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