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How to Fix a Prior

  • Isaac Levi
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 236)

Abstract

We sometimes add new information to our states of full belief by routine expansion and sometimes by deliberate expansion. (Levi, 1980a, ch.2; 1991b, ch.3.)

Keywords

Rational Agent Probability Logic Belief State Credal State Expansion Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isaac Levi
    • 1
  1. 1.Columbia UniversityUSA

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