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Aesthetic “Certification” and its Strategies

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Aesthetics and Economics
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Abstract

Information asymmetry from aesthetic qualification gives rise to the search for information on the consumer’ s side. Neither the market nor the fixing of administrative standards can solve the information problem (see chapter 4). Consumers in search of a higher level of certainty on the quality of the goods they are going to buy resort to institutional solutions. They explicitly ask “someone” for a previous judgement on their quality. “Someone” who has to be trusted not because he represents any sort of public interest or collective willingness, but because “he knows” what other people do not know about quality. In people’s opinion, this “someone” is entitled to “certify” because he is able “to interpret”; that is to perceive the aesthetic qualification of the good, even while other people (ordinary consumers) do not.

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Notes

  1. Tollison (1992) suggests the conception of the Medieval Church as a “coercive monopoly” acting as a multi-national profit-maximizing organization.

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  2. Mill (1848), book V, chapter II, sec. 8.’

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  3. Tollison (1992) refers that definition to the Medieval Church, explaining how it was “the broker between adepts and salvation”.

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  4. Scitovsky (1988).

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  5. Mossetto (1992 b) for a wider discussion of Marshall’s position on the arts.

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  6. Marshall (1920), pp. 215–216.

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  7. Ibidem, loc. cit.

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  8. Tullock (1980) “Rent-seeking as a negative-sum game”, in Buchanan, Tollison, Tullock (1980), p. 20.

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  9. “Rent-seeking (…) refers to activity motivated by rent but leading to socially undesirable consequences”. Buchanan “Rent seeking and profit seeking”, in Buchanan, Tollison, Tullock, (1980) p. 8.

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  10. McChesney “Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation, “ in Rowley, Tollison, Tullock, (1988), p.s.

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  11. McCormick, Shughart, Tollison (1984).

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  12. The market size, increasing the screening costs of quality definition and the risk of failure in quality identification, is a good justification of the monopolistic organization of the cultural market.

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Mossetto, G. (1993). Aesthetic “Certification” and its Strategies. In: Aesthetics and Economics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8236-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8236-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4277-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8236-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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