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What Has Probability to do with Strength of Belief

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Philosophy of Probability

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 56))

Abstract

There is an old dispute in Western philosophy about whether the human mind is active or passive in the process of acquiring knowledge concerning the facts and laws of Nature. According to Descartes we articulate such knowledge in voluntary judgements whereby we either assent to or dissent from some relevant mental representation. Thus each item of conscious knowledge is gained by an act of free-will. But according to Hume we learn about Nature via the formation of beliefs and-on his view-a person’s beliefs are not controllable by his will. In other words on Hume’s view our knowledge of nature is not acquired by voluntary acts of cognitive judgement, as Descartes held, but by the involuntary growth of cognitive feelings.

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Notes

  1. F.P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931, p. 166ff.

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  2. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability: A Critical and Introductory Treatment, trans. A. Machi and A. Smith, London: John Wiley, 1974, p. 3.

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  4. E.g. H. Kyburg, ‘Rational Belief’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 1983, p. 236.

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  5. E.g. H. Kyburg, ‘Rational Belief’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 1983. p. 173.

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  6. E.g. A. Einstein and L. Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938, p. 224.

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  7. B. van Fraassen, ‘Belief and the Will’, Journal of Philosophy 81, 1984, pp. 235–256.

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  8. L.J. Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 40–114.

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Cohen, L.J. (1993). What Has Probability to do with Strength of Belief. In: Dubucs, JP. (eds) Philosophy of Probability. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 56. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8208-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8208-7_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4301-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8208-7

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