Inductive Logic Revisited

  • Jacques-Paul Dubucs
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 56)


The main objective of inductive logic is to give a satisfactory analysis of the intuitive relation of confirmation, which relates two sentences when one supports the other without the truth of the first one being however logically (in the sense of deductive logic) inconsistent with the falsity of the second one. Carnap has tried to build such an inductive logic, the seminal idea of which was the conformity of the relation of confirmation to the principles of the calculus of probability. This attempt gave rise to many difficulties, and it is today widely considered as a dead end. I would like to show that this opinion is not definitely well-founded, and that Carnap’s construction may be cleared from much of this criticism provided some slight alterations are accepted.


Inductive Logic Deductive Logic Conditional Logic Partial Deducibility Normal Notion 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jacques-Paul Dubucs
    • 1
  1. 1.C.N.R.S.University of Paris I-SorbonneFrance

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