On the Logic of Relevance

  • Peter Gärdenfors
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 56)


When we judge the probability of a statement r we try to take into account as much information as possible. But not all information that we have, or can obtain, is relevant to r, and it is only relevant information that is of any importance. Thus ‘relevance’ ought to be a central concept in the philosophy of science. However, the logical foundations of this concept have not been discussed very much. The purpose of this paper is to show that the traditional account is unsatisfactory and to suggest an alternative analysis of the relevance relation.


Probability Measure Logical Consequence Logical Foundation Relevance Relation Intuitive Conception 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Gärdenfors
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LundSweden

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