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On Higher Order Beliefs

  • Nils-Eric Sahlin
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 56)

Abstract

This paper is about higher order beliefs and probabilities. First, I will show how higher order beliefs add to our comprehension of judgmental and decision processes. Second, some well-known arguments against higher order beliefs represented in terms of higher order probabilities, as well as counter arguments, will be summarized and scrutinized. Third, an unpublished note by F. P. Ramsey on “unknown probabilities” will be discussed.

Keywords

Subjective Probability Objective Probability Criminal Case Probability Assessment Outcome Risk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nils-Eric Sahlin
    • 1
  1. 1.Lund UniversitySweden

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