Causal Laws are Objectifications of Inductive Schemes

  • Wolfgang Spohn
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 56)


And this paper is an attempt to say precisely how, thus addressing a philosophical problem which is commonly taken to be a serious one. It does so, however, in quite an idiosyncratic way. It is based on the account of inductive schemes I have given in (1988) and 1990a) and on the conception of causation I have presented in (1980), (1983), and (1990b), and it intends to fill one of many gaps which have been left by these papers.


Epistemic State Sufficient Reason Objective Probability Direct Causation Belief Function 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfgang Spohn
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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