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Mohanty’s Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology

  • Burt C. Hopkins
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Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 11)

Abstract

Toward the end of situating the results of my study within the context of the second variation of the second tendency, noted above, in the literature addressing the Husserl-Heidegger relation, I will consider Mohanty’s careful and insightful attempts to seek a rapprochement between descriptive and hermeneutical phenomenology. He argues that

[b]oth sorts of phenomenology—descriptive as well as interpretive—can be either naive or self-critical. When they are naive, they perceive each other as opposed. When they are self-critical, they recognize each other as complementary, and, in fact, as mutually inseparable.1

As a result, “phenomenology and hermeneutics stand in a peculiar dialectical relation to each other.”2 However, unlike Ricoeur’s formulation of a dialectic between the two in terms of the reciprocal “presupposition” of the intentional uncovering of meaning and Auslegung, in Mohanty’s formulation, this dialectic has its basis in the intentional “dialectic of reflection and reflected upon.”3 Such a dialectic has as its terms, on the one hand, the dimension of transcendental subjectivity whose corporeal, historical and linguistic excess makes reflection and transcendental philosophy possible; and, on the other hand, the impossibility of “a complete coincidence between reflection and the reflected upon,”4 which discloses the situatedness of consciousness in sedimented (and hence, in some sense, “opaque”5) meanings, and its consequent necessary involvement in the hermeneutical circle.6

Keywords

Transcendental Phenomenology Hermeneutic Circle Complete Coincidence Transcendental Philosophy Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account,op. cit., p. 60.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Phenomenology and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 115.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Ibid., p. 120.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Ibid., p. 117.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Ibid., p. 113; cf. Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account, op. cit., p. 60.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Ibid., 116.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Mohanty, “Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation between Husserl and Heidegger,” op. cit., p. 331; cf. “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 115.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Phenomenology and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 109.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Ibid., p. 109.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Mohanty, “Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation between Husserl and Heidegger,” op. cit., p. 328; cf., “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 109.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    See §§ 18, 35 above.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 109.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    See §§ 92,101, 106 above.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Mohanty, “Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger,” op. cit., p. 328.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 109; See also Gadamer’s agreement on this, discussed in § 110 above.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account,op. cit., p. 59.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    See § 51 above.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    See §§ 50–51 above.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    See §§ 50, 83, 100 above.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    See §§ 45, 70 above.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account,op. cit., p. 21.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 117.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Ibid., p. 113.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Ibid., p. 116.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Ibid., p. 117.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
  27. 27.
    Mohanty, “The Destiny of Transcendental Philosophy,” in The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy, ( Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985 ), p. 218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account,” op. cit., p. 53.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 117.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
  31. 31.
    Ibid., emphasis added.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    See §§ 105–106 above.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    See §§ 89, 92 above.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    See §§ 105–106 above.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Burt C. Hopkins
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySeattle UniversityUSA

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