Abstract
Toward the end of situating the results of the present study in terms of the most prevalent tendency cited above, I will single out Gadamer’s eloquent and challenging treatment of the problem. As Mohanty has pointed out, Gadamer is “appreciative of the goal, the inner potentiality, and even the universality of the transcendental-phenomenological research.”I Indeed, Gadamer clearly, and in my view quite correctly, recognizes something which many who are partial to the Heideggerian prerogative of the phenomenological priority of the Seinsfrage do not see, namely, that for Husserl “not all consciousness is consciousness of an object, or better, objectifying consciousness.”2 Gadamer is also careful not to fall into the trap of interpreting Husserl’s methodological preoccupations as somehow symptomatic of uncritical adherence to the Cartesian epistemology and its attendant “dogmatism of an immanent consciousness, which must ask: How can we transcend ourselves and make contact with the external world?”3 Again, in my view he rightly sees that “Husserl overcame this by demonstrating that consciousness is exactly intentionality, which means that we are in the matter and not simply enclosed in ourselves.”4 And finally, Gadamer is aware that, for Husserl, phenomenologically methodical reflection is not to be confused with traditionally understood “inner-perception,” since it “is not exploring the ‘inner perception’ of a real ‘l’.”5
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Notes
Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 111.
Gadamer, “The Phenomenological Movement,”
Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” op. Phenomenological Movement,“ op. cit., pp. 131
Ibid; Cf. Truth and Method, op. cit., p. 249
Gadamer, Truth and Method,op. cit., p. 244.
Cf. Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and of Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 112.
Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” op
Gadamer, “The Phenomenological Movement,”
Cf., my discussion of the issue of immanence in
Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” op
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 62.
Gadamer, “The Phenomenological Movement,”
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 171.
Ibid., p. 169.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 169.
Ibid., p. 170.
Regarding this distinction see §§ 42, 45, 70 abov
See § 39 above.
Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” op
Mohanty, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 112.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hopkins, B.C. (1993). Gadamer’s Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger. In: Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_12
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