On What There Isn’t: The Meinong—Russell Dispute

Abstract

Most commentaries on the Russell—Meinong debate have been content to portray it from Russell’s point of view. By following the course of the controversy in some detail, we show it to have been more complex and less one—sided than usually depicted. Both philosophers initially stressed their agreement, but the fundamental differences as to whether there are non-existent objects and whether the usual laws of logic apply without restriction soon became prominent. On these basic positions, neither budged. But in the course of the controversy, they practically swapped positions on the theory of meaning, Russell jettisoning the remnants of a three—tiered theory of meaning for a two—tiered one, Meinong meanwhile interposing a third tier. Russell’s influence on Meinong lasted longer and was more positive than conversely, but both benefited from the exchange, and provided paradigms for later theories of meaning and reference. After an evaluation of the outcome of the debate, a brief outline of subsequent developments is given.

“There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate ‘not—being’ is not applicable to any being...And if not to being, then not to something.” (Plato, The Sophist 237^c.)

“I acknowledge that a man cannot perceive an object that does not exist; nor can he remember an object that does not exist; but there appears to me to be no contradiction in his conceiving an object that neither does not ever did exist.”(Thomas Reid, Essays on the intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter II.)

“Those who like paradoxical modes of expression could very well say: ‘There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.’ ” (Meinong UGP 9, GA 2 490, RBP 83.)

“For my part, I am not convinced there are any non-subsistent objects. But let us see what the arguments against them are.” (Russell, RUGP 532, EA 80.)

The paper from which this is translated, “Über das, was es nicht gibt: Die Meinong—Russell Kontroverse”, appeared in Zeitschrift für Semiotik 10 (1988), 399–426, and I wish to thank the editor, Roland Posner, for permission to publish a translation. The article was written some time earlier however, and I have taken the opportunity to incorporate minor changes resulting from new developments and some changes of mind on my part, which affect only matters of detail. Some of the material in the later parts may seem elementary to philosophical specialists; this is explained by the fact that the paper was written not only for them.